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14 October 1983

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Closer Cooperation Between Commonwealth, ECOWAS Discussed (WEST AFRICA, 5 Sep 83).....	1
Undermining of African Group at LOS Conference Reported (WEST AFRICA, 5 Sep 83).....	3
Significance of Franco-African Summit at Vittel Noted (WEST AFRICA, 19 Sep 83).....	7
Ambitious Plans for Africa's Transport Reviewed (AFRICA NOW, Sep 83).....	10
Problems of Graduate Unemployment Highlighted (WEST AFRICA, 12 Sep 83).....	13
Black Africa's Military Capability Assessed (Kevin Toolis; WEST AFRICA, 12 Sep 83).....	14

ANGOLA

Big Demand for Portuguese Visas Noted (O DIA, 18 Aug 83).....	18
--	----

CAPE VERDE

Three Million Dollar Credit Agreement With Brazil Signed (VOZ DI POVO, 21 Jul 83).....	18
Cooperation Agreement Signed With France (VOZ DI POVO, 12 Jul 83).....	20

COMORO ISLANDS

Briefs Relations With SA	21
-----------------------------	----

DJIBOUTI

Agricultural Potential Seen as Proven, Developing (LA NATION, 1 Sep 83).....	22
Progress in Road System, Agriculture Reported (LA NATION, 1 Sep 83).....	25
National Army Improving Roads Nomads Make Agricultural Progress in Desert Country	
Concept of Marshall-Plan Aid for Africa Suggested (Guimo Tikessou; AFRICA, Aug-Sep 83).....	28
Briefs Tadjourah Water Plant	35

GUINEA-BISSAU

Minister of Economy Favors Cooperation With Portugal (JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 3 Sep 83).....	36
Ministers Dismissed for Political Reason (Editorial, Xiavier de Figueiredo; EXPRESSO, 27 Aug 83).....	38
Ambassador Rebuts GHANAIAN TIMES Editorial (DAILY OBSERVER, 12 Sep 83).....	41

LIBERIA

Briefs Work Permit Revenue	42
-------------------------------	----

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Health Minister Visits Portugal To Strengthen Cooperation (DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 15 Aug 83).....	43
Briefs Airport Expansion	44

SOMALIA

Party Official, Minister Return From Visits (Mogadishu Domestic Service, 30 Sep 83).....	45
Briefs Civilian Defections Reported	46

SOUTH AFRICA

Transkei Leader's Pay Raise Draws Comment (AFRICA NOW, Sep 83).....	47
Reserve Bank Report Shows Easing of Recession (Johannesburg Domestic Service, 4 Oct 83).....	49
Financial Implications of New Constitutional Structure (BEELD, 3 Sep 83).....	50
Conservative Attacks Government Concessions to Homelands (DIE AFRIKANER, 31 Aug 83).....	52
Ultraconservative Leaders Still Disunited (DIE PATRIOT, 26 Aug 83).....	55
Results of Sterilization Program (DIE BURGER, 8 Sep 83).....	57
MWU Official Warns Against Multiracial Union Aims (DIE AFRIKANER, 31 Aug 83).....	59
Briefs	
Political Role of Church	61
Lesotho Attack Charge	61

TANZANIA

Dar Es Salaam Reports 2-Day Meeting of Army High Command (Dar Es Salaam Domestic Service, 30 Sep 83).....	62
--	----

UPPER VOLTA

Briefs	
CDR Functions	63

ZAIRE

Zairian Opposition Leader on Mobutu's Regime (Etienne Tsishekedi Interview; KNACK, 10 Aug 83).....	64
---	----

ZAMBIA

Briefs	
Swedish Development Aid	68

CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH, ECOWAS DISCUSSED

London WEST AFRICA in English 5 Sep 83 pp 2047-48

[Malchet's Diary Column: "ECOWAS and Commonwealth"]

[Text] A LONG overdue contact to discuss closer co-operation between the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken place in London between the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr. Aboubakar Diaby-Ouattara, and Commonwealth Deputy Secretary-General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku. Both organisations have made a point of making contacts with other groupings. Dr. Ouattara has studied groupings in Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, and has participated in co-ordination with other groupings, both within Africa (in the ECA context) and outside it (at UNCTAD). The Commonwealth Secretariat has also developed links with other regional organisations like the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in which Commonwealth countries participate.

I am told it was agreed at the discussions that ties between the two organisations should be strengthened. The Secretariat would favourably consider requests from ECOWAS for assistance in such fields as collaboration with donor countries or other international agencies. ECOWAS also indicated its wish to host a meeting of the heads of regional organisations, which the Secretariat would sponsor, in August 1984. The Secretariat has sponsored two such meetings in the past to assist these organisations to develop inter-regional links and benefit from each other's experience in tackling common problems. The last meeting, held in Georgetown, Guyana, in July

1980, was arranged with the assistance of CARICOM.

In the old West

The long shadow of history loomed over me when a member of my staff discovered an old file of mine from 1965 marked "Western Election Dossier". This contained a collection of notes of mine as well as of Nigerian newspapers, plus British press cuttings and fragments of news agency tapes from October 1965, the month of the notorious elections in the then Western Region of Nigeria, which led to the explosive situation that formed the background to the 1966 coup. Unearthing this old file, where all the cuttings are now the colour of those from the *Financial Times*, took me back to that terrible time, which was almost my first induction into Nigerian politics (my second visit), and inevitably had me searching for echoes in the present time. We find, for instance, a night curfew in Ibadan owing, says the government statement, "to the rather tense situation created by people who have made up their minds to cause confusion, riot or disorder during and immediately after the period of the election." We find electoral officers being attacked, and people arrested for possessing large quantities of ballot papers. (I remember myself visiting a police station in Ibadan where Yoruba hats stuffed with ballot papers were lined up on the counter: upstairs, Bisi Onabanjo, now Ogun State Governor, who had just been arrested, called down to journalists from a balcony "have you seen the rigging?")

Lightning conductor

Although, for all sorts of reasons it would be unwise to say history is automatically repeating itself, the file also contains grim stories of violence and killing, and then as now we have Bola Ige being accused on incitement, only then he was legally charged for it (and refused bail). When I showed the paper to a colleague he said "Uncle Bola always was a rhetorician". And here we find Wole Soyinka, charged with stealing two tapes in the radio station incident. Then, as now, this professor, playwright, Justice of the Peace, traffic warden extraordinary, and of late, recording star, seemed to be drawn inevitably to the eye of the whirlwind. This time round, in 1983, he certainly seems to be playing the role of lightning conductor, and has already attracted considerable attention and anger in Nigeria because of his broadcast on the BBC African Service in which he spoke of "civil war", two words calculated to inflame feeling. I listened to the broadcast, which struck me as a rather incoherent presentation of his case, and have studied an 11-page document he has now circulated. This seems much more eloquent (as when, he speaks of "millions of ghost voters" defying the political will of "several millions flesh-and-blood") but he is surely mistaken to start denouncing foreign journalists so bitterly and at such length. Quite apart from the justice of the attack, some of these are people he might need.

When I met him in London a few days ago he seemed infinitely weary, stressing all along that he had predicted what would happen, but that few had believed him. He elaborated to me his conception of elections in Nigeria as a kind of war (a concept which some friends of mine in the NPN would not dispute) which need to be approached as a military campaign, with "no go" areas, areas of basic control, no-man's lands, and enemy territory, with a different strategy for each. His descrip-

tion of how this approach even spilt over onto the campus at Ife, and of his own conflicts with the NPN Chairman in Oyo State, Chief Alawode (inevitably from Modakeke) who calls himself "007", deserves one day to be recorded at length.

In the meantime, using one of Wole's own titles "Season of anomy" *The Guardian* (Lagos) has produced an editorial which gets nearer the sad truth about some aspects of these elections than much else I have read: "Not a single one of the major political parties can justly claim to have conducted itself without blemish in the elections so far held. There is sufficient evidence of brazen and cynical rigging to suggest they they all approached the election without much faith either in themselves or in the electorate". In my own experience, all parties say they have to engage in unorthodox practices because the other side do it. As often as not this means you rig when you do not need to do it, simply to show you are boss in a particular area (a little like K. O. Mbaduwe's "Operation No Entry" for the NCNC in Orlu in the 1964 general election). Conflict arises when you have "rigging against the tide", or genuinely split communities, and then all manner of other influences come into play. One of the problems for the UPN in Oyo state was, I was told, that some of the best "party organisers" were among those who decamped. Governor-elect Olunloyo told me himself that he considered Adelakun, Ibadan's best known decampee from the UPN as his "scarecrow". Not that the UPN did not keep its end up in its areas of strength. Dr. Ajejune, NAP's Director of Ideology was at FEDECO complaining of systematic scaring away of other parties' polling agents in Lagos State, as well as of "activists" at polling stations lobbying voters with the slogan "drop it for Papa". The final comment that may perhaps be made on this aspect of election management in Nigeria is that in the case of NPN (to pick up once again the James Bond *leitmotif*) "nobody does it better."

UNDERMINING OF AFRICAN GROUP AT LOS CONFERENCE REPORTED

London WEST AFRICA in English 5 Sep 83 pp 2059-62

[Text]

THE REPUTATION of the African Group at international negotiations is well known to all the regional groups in the United Nations system. At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, held towards the end of last year, unity of the Group ensured that whatever interests could be identified were protected. It was largely thanks to its leadership that, among other things, the provisions relating to sea-bed mining were achieved, at the time with the agreement of pro-Reagan, Western industrialised countries. That reputation faltered in Kingston earlier this year at the commencement of a new round of negotiations on the setting up of two new international organisations called the International Sea-Bed Authority and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.

Africa arrived in Kingston with one candidate for the chairmanship of the Preparatory Commission, unanimously chosen from within the Group in New York. While unity appeared to reign, the Africans demanded and were granted the right to produce the chairman. Harassed by internal problems, both the Spanish-speaking Latin American and some Western industrialised countries insisted that this notwithstanding, Africa must change its chosen candidate. Few took this seriously at first because it was unprecedented for outsiders to dictate to a regional group who was to be its candidate, especially where the candidacy was not contested within that Group.

Yet, within a week, a number of African delegates had become agents of discord, requesting an alternative candidate in order to satisfy a handful of unidentified Latins and Western industrialised coun-

tries. Shock waves ran through the Commission as the most reputed, experienced and former chairman was dropped by the Group and another, Western-sponsored, was endorsed in his place!

This is no fiction. The credibility of the African Group is being openly declared to weigh less than an ounce. Its bargaining power greatly reduced, it must await the consequences. All of this happened while an African, Algeria's Ambassador Alouane, was chairman of the Group of 77. His behaviour in this matter, according to reports, not only left much to be desired, but demonstrated that the chairman was designer of this African disaster.

"The worst enemy of Africa is the African himself". This saying was part of the lament of many pioneers in the African struggle for a place in the sun. Today, history records its truth in daily occurrences involving the wellbeing of our peoples and the rich continent on which we were fortunately planted.

Last December, a great landmark was established by the UN system in Montego Bay, Jamaica. On the very first day, 117 nations signed the new UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In tune with the aspirations of a new international economic order, the treaty declared the vast area and resources of the deep sea-bed to be the common heritage of mankind. The modalities of this concept proved to be complex and extremely difficult because of the diversity of the economic and strategic interests of nations, big and small, as well as the novelty of the concept itself.

The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea assigned the delicate negotiations to its First Committee. Africa provided the chairmanship of the committee, drafting

one of her knowledgeable sons, Mr. Paul Bamele Engo of Cameroon. Through the decade of negotiations, Mr. Engo undoubtedly demonstrated rare capacities for leadership in the face of pressures.

The new Convention created a new international organisation to be styled the International Sea-Bed Authority to manage the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the sea-bed. The chosen seat is Jamaica. To launch this, a preparatory commission was established. It had its first meeting in Kingston, Jamaica from March 15 to April 8 this year.

The Africans claimed a right to chair the preparatory commission. This was based on the fact that Asia had chaired the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and that a Caribbean member of the Latin American group (Jamaica) was granted the chair of the Sea-Bed Authority. Members of the African Group at the UN contacted their governments in search of a candidate. Many privately requested that Cameroon should make available the same national who perhaps alone had accumulated expertise, stature and repute. Cameroon's new government, it was reported, made critical contacts with both African and non-African governments. Encouraged by the results, President Paul Biya finally informed the African Group that he was proposing Mr. Engo for chairman of the preparatory commission.

In the meantime, certain Western countries, who still refuse to sign the Convention, were determined to frustrate the Convention and the preparatory commission. They have since been working on a so-called "mini-treaty", intended to rival the sea-bed aspects of the Convention. To do this successfully, there were two critical steps: one was to speed up negotiations among US allies on the mini-treaty; the other was to ensure that work at the preparatory commission stalled. The only option with regard to the latter was to seek a chairman of the preparatory commission who was either completely sympathetic to the new American intransigence, or could be manipulated at the will of the Western countries. Obviously, Mr. Engo was not a Western European and his strength of character would not permit such manipulation. Things would move too fast with him in the saddle.

The Law of the Sea Secretariat, meanwhile, was facing embarrassing questions in the Fifth (finance) Committee of the UN General Assembly. It had been set up to

serve the Law of the Sea Conference. With the end of that conference, what was the justification for the Secretariat's continued existence? A compromise resulted in an extension of its life for just one more year.

Here again, the prospect of an Engo chairmanship was disquieting. His personality would naturally attract so much attention to the Commission. He is considered sympathetic to the Commission's sessions being held in Jamaica, consistent with Resolution I of the conference and General Assembly [which was adopted with the Convention on April 30 as part of a package], but which was not popular with the head of the Secretariat. Secondly, First Committee Chairman Engo relied a great deal on a technical division for ocean affairs, now headed by an African, Mr. Shuaib Uthman Yolah, a UN Under-Secretary General.

The head of the Law of the Sea Secretariat, Mr. Bernardo Zuleta, a Latin American from Colombia, is reported to have seen the writing on the wall. An Engo chairmanship of the preparatory commission would most probably intensify direct co-operation with Mr. Yolah and undermine his Secretariat. Furthermore, Mr. Engo was not amenable to manoeuvres! There was also fear of a personality clash, some sources disclose.

From these two fronts, a campaign against Mr. Engo commenced even before the Montego Bay meeting. Undeclared "Stop-Engo" teams were formed as dinners, luncheons and special meetings were systematically organised. The Europeans wanted a European chairman but would not dare say it. The Secretariat chief would prefer an Asian, Ambassador Tommy Koh (Singapore), who was the Law of the Sea Conference President during its last two sessions. Perhaps Mr. Thompson Flores of Brazil, Engo's vice-chairman at the conference, would be brought in through the back door.

To diminish Engo's prospects, it became necessary to divide Africa. Western countries in the conspiracy let it be known that they would prefer Mr. Tommy Koh. Asia refused to enter into direct conflict with Africa. Approaches were consequently made to Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Tanzania to enter the list of seven or eight candidates the West preferred. The hope was that four candidates from Africa would remove that continent from the race.

Unhappily for this plan, the African Group at the UN unanimously endorsed

and adopted Paul Bamele Engo of Cameroon as their sole candidate, with Sierra Leone reportedly speaking glowingly about him. The West and the UN Secretariat then intensified their campaign for Koh.

The Asian diplomat refused to be a candidate. A "draft-Koh" movement was born, it is said, to induce a clash in the well-known Koh-Engo friendship and open the way to a closely-guarded Scandinavian name. The Latins did not entirely give up on the Brazilian. No one would, however, venture a formal candidate to oppose the African candidate. Through meetings (termed "consultations") organised by the UN Secretary-General (himself a Latin American), the idea was fostered that the preparatory commission chairman had to be elected, not by ballot but by *consensus* of all the regional groups at the United Nations. Naively, the chairman of the African Group agreed, assuring himself that there could be no doubt about any candidate his Group would produce.

It is this "consensus" rule that provided a weapon for the adversaries of Africa in Kingston. It was alleged that Engo did not enjoy a consensus in all the regions. No reasons were given for so-called reservations on him. It was unnecessary to cook up reasons. Asia said it would support any candidate who enjoyed widespread support among all regional groups. Eastern Europe would only support a candidate proposed by the Group of 77. Western Europe had no consensus within its group regarding any candidate. Latin America was reported to be divided on the endorsement of any candidate, the Caribbean nations making it clear that they stood with the unanimous African choice.

So it went and the clock ticked its way through ten days. The insinuation campaign began, it is reported, that Africans were delaying matters. This accusation was to be echoed in the lobbies by the delegations of Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mauritius, most of whom admitted, even to unidentified correspondents, that they had long been "approached" by certain unnamed Western and Latin countries. The local press talked openly about the acts of the "unseen hand", leaving no doubt the US was very much involved.

What happened in the secret African meetings is hard to articulate, because each delegate gave a version consistent with his position. There was no secrecy over the usual official interpretation, it was felt, and

thus the Group arranged, paradoxically, for a Cameroonian delegate to help with interpretation. As prudence compelled silence from the Cameroonian camp, it remains difficult to know the whole truth of what procedures were followed.

It is a known fact, however, that a move spearheaded by Nigeria's High Commissioner to Jamaica, to effect the choice of an alternative candidate was thrice beaten back by the African Group. On the third occasion, the Group decided at midnight to call for a plenary meeting of the commission with a view to forcing a vote, if necessary, on the *only* announced candidate, Mr. Engo.)

Panic swept the camp of Engo adversaries. They had always avoided a popularity contest, which he was bound to win, whether the ballot be open or secret. Western Europe's Japan, strategically placed as the Asian group's chairman, had had to reverse the Groups' decision to support Engo announced the day before. It is reported that he actually interrupted an African Group meeting to present what many regarded as an ultimatum.

By daybreak, the conspirators, including reportedly some of Engo's African brothers, had reassembled to plan strategy. The only way to stop Engo then was to block the convening of the meeting. At midday, the African Chairman, The Gambia's Ambassador Blain, announced that Under-Secretary Zuleta, *protem* chairman of the commission, had refused to convene the plenary session. Mr. Zuleta stated that he was under strict instructions from the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, not to convene a plenary meeting unless there was a consensus of all regional groups to do this. So the request of a group of sovereign States, comprising one-third of the participating nations, and being an influential geographical region, was unprecedentedly rejected by the supposedly "neutral" international civil servants.

The shock brought impotence and frustration to many of those Africans who had stuck to principle. That was what was intended by others anyway. The sequence of events is hard to place in any rational chronology.

It is generally known, however, that Tunisia's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Slim, was urgently flown in. Next day he was to propose formally in a closed African Group meeting that Tanzania's Minister of Justice, Mr. Joseph Warioba, should be

endorsed as a new African candidate. Well-orchestrated debate followed, most delegates too stunned to participate. It was said that the unannounced meeting had no quorum! It is reported that many left the room. Ambassador Slim was declared the symbol of wisdom and Africa's old man. One delegate jokingly observed that the conspirators needed an older man to challenge the menacing personality of Engo.

Thus Wanioba was "chosen and support withdrawn" from Engo. In the process Engo entered the list of those, like Tanzania's Salim Salim, who underlined Western abhorrence of African leadership in important institutions. Africa has suffered a serious setback, not only because of a devastating blow to its credibility, but also because of the deep divisions and distrust

that this incident has brought. In both political and economic terms, no one can afford the uncontrolled consequences of this obvious disaster.

As for the Group of 77, the loose strings of unity may well have snapped too. The common cause of the North-South struggle may not exist from now on. Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia and others are virtually industrialised and may soon take their place among sea-bed miners. The poor developing nations of Africa will soon discover that their support is now limited to the few nations of the Caribbean area and many in the old Afro-Asian Group.

CSO: 3400/39

SIGNIFICANCE OF FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT AT VITTEL NOTED

London WEST AFRICA in English 19 Sep 83 p 2163

[Text]

ALL THE SIGNS are that this year's Franco-African summit, to be held at the beginning of October, will be more pregnant with political significance than usual. It had originally been intended to hold the annual conference, at which the French President meets with a number of African leaders, onboard the liner *Jean Mermoz*, anchored off the port of Toulon, but when it turned out that it was too late to obtain a booking (even for presidential reasons), the spa of Vittel, renowned for its mineral waters, was chosen.

Although a venue can exercise an influence on a meeting, no one is suggesting that the organisers are trying to avoid attacks of dyspepsia or liverishness. Past meetings have been notable for the way in which the "family atmosphere" which the French have always encouraged in their relations with African states has been mobilised to smooth over frictions between different countries attending the meeting, including problems between France and one or other African state.

The regular scenario for the Franco-African summit in the past has been for one or two very short plenary sessions, followed by a bland communique on subjects like economic relations, with most of the time being spent in group or bilateral contacts in corridor or villa. No one has ever walked out because there is very little to walk out from. Questions like the Shaba intervention or the activities of Emperor Bokassa were always discussed on the sidelines.

One feature of the Franco-African summits which has grown and grown has been the progressive drowning of the idea of a contact between France and her former African colonies, or between France and francophone Africa, and the development of a concept of a meeting between France and all of Africa, as if to say that France, alone of all other countries, and certainly of developed countries, has a particular relationship with Africa: this is simply a way of recognising it institutionally.

This might seem a dreadful anachronism, or even an

encouragement of some of the worst aspects of relations between developed and developing countries. But it is arguably a reflection of realities. No other country, of either East or West, maintains such a high profile in its African relations. While there may be more Cuban troops overall, the complex of military, economic and cultural relations maintained by France in a wide number of African states unparalleled by any other power outside Africa. Whatever else may be said about the innovations that President Mitterrand and the Socialists introduced in their policies, in Africa and the developing world as a whole, it was clear, even from before the May 1981 elections, that the high profile in Africa was to be maintained. In this context the August decision to intervene massively in Chad was the logical conclusion of having decided to maintain this high profile in France's African sphere of influence, complete with its network of defence agreements. The decision to intervene, painful as it may have been, had the inevitability of a moment of truth.

It is the background of the Chad intervention which will make the Vittel summit peculiarly interesting. Nothing dramatic may happen there. Interest is already concentrated on whether President Habré will attend. A similar question arose last year, when his appearance in Kinshasa, adroitly promoted by President Mobutu Sese Seko, acted as a somewhat curious legitimization of his power.

Indeed, the importance of appearances underlines the ritual value of these occasions. Franco-African summits are, on one level, rites to consecrate France's continued interest in Africa. It was, after all, this continued interest (encompassing both self-interest and alleged possible interests of her closest friends on the continent) which dictated the Chad intervention. Pressure from some francophone states came partly, it was said, from concern at Libya's alleged activities in Africa (the Upper Volta coup of August 5 in which some simplistically saw a hidden Libyan hand came two days before President Mitterrand's decision), but there is no doubt that the veiled threat by some countries to turn towards the USA for assistance reinforced French resolve.

The mischievous might even suppose that it was the American rather than the Libyan threat which precipitated French action. At all events France is now there in force, uncomfortably exposed, observing an uneasy status quo along the 15th parallel. Some commentators see this as evidence that Gaddafi has already achieved more than he had hoped, in that he has gained a de facto control over a large part of northern Chad, with a tacit admission that the French will not take him on there if they can help it.

The stress on negotiation is also to Gaddafi's advantage in that it contains an implicit recognition that the present situation of Habré, with undivided power in Ndjamena, is unacceptable. Neither of these conditions are satisfactory

to Habré. But it is unlikely that, in the run-up to Vittel, he will either be able to affect the military stalemate, or avoid paying lip-service to some kind of peace talks, however disinclined he may be and however woeful the precedents. At all events, the eyes of the world (and especially of the French public, now directly involved because of the French troops present in a war situation) will this year be subjecting this unusual gathering to a particularly close scrutiny.

CSO: 3400/39

AMBITIOUS PLANS FOR AFRICA'S TRANSPORT REVIEWED

London AFRICA NOW in English Sep 83 pp 95-98

[Text]

At its Jubilee meeting in Ethiopia earlier this year, the Economic Commission for Africa stated: "The inadequacy of Africa's transport and communications infrastructure, coupled with the inefficiency of the services, remain obstacles to the general and social development of the region."

Average road density is only 0.05km/km², far below the average of developing countries as a whole. Earth roads, many passable only during the dry season, still make up the majority of national road networks, effectively cutting off villages and agriculturally productive areas for much of the year.

The African rail system, says the report, consists largely of several short independent national systems of different gauges. Their age, poor construction and inadequate maintenance mean that average operating speed is about 40km/hour. Railway traffic is low and increasing by less than 2% a year.

In the field of air transport the continent is well served with African and non-African airlines. But links between African countries themselves are poor and there is little co-operation between the 51 African-owned airlines.

Without co-ordinated transport and communications systems covering the continent, there is little hope of any economic development or growth in Africa, ECA's secretariat reported.

Integrated transport systems also have a prominent role in the Lagos Plan of Action and its overall vision of increased African inter-dependence and ultimately an African Common Market. It was in this context that ECA sought United Nations endorsement for a special UN Decade for Transport and Communications in Africa. The Decade was given UN approval in 1977 to run from 1978-88 under ECA's direction, and it is now at the half-way stage.

How successful has it been? According to Percy Mangoela, deputy co-ordinator of the decade and based at ECA headquarters in Ethiopia, it has been a qualified success. About 50% of the Phase 1 programme was achieved, he says, a higher success rate than many similar UN special years and decades.

But there is little chance that the major aims will have been fulfilled by 1988. Major international routes remain only in the planning stage and global recession has encouraged many African states to look inwards rather than towards increased co-operation with neighbouring states.

While some of the Decade programme has found finance and been implemented, it is quite impossible to assess which projects would, with or without a special decade, have gone ahead anyway. With only limited funds of its own and no voice on the major funding institutions like the World Bank and European Development Fund, ECA has not been in a strong position to press states to make regional and subregional projects a priority.

ECA's global strategy for implementing the first stage received a major blow at the outset. The Commission had hoped to finance the programme with funds secured through pledging conferences, hoping thus to keep a clear overview of transport investment and divert resources to priorities. But the first pledging conference organised in 1979 by the UN general-secretary proved a dismal failure with only \$158,588 pledged, mainly by African countries themselves. Subsequent pledging conferences have proved more successful but ECA has concentrated only on finding backing for technical support programmes, rather than projects.

Developed countries and the major multilateral funding institutions have made it clear that, while willing to fund and implement Decade projects, they intend to

carry on with traditional funding methods. One important objective of the decade was therefore lost: the idea of a global strategy that could help develop a co-ordinated system rather than leave African nations at the mercy of the random technologies of whichever donating developed country offered funds. The problems posed for establishing a co-ordinated standard gauge railway network, for example, are obvious.

It has also become clear that, with traditional methods of funding unchanged, it is national rather than regional or subregional projects which have been given priority. A report to this year's ECA meeting on progress in the transport sector notes with regret that individual country efforts have been more directed to their own projects than to the Decade's broad strategy. Regional projects have been neglected. In fairness to the "guilty" countries, however, it is difficult to see how bilaterally-funded projects could be other than nationally orientated.

ECA has suggested that African countries involved in regional or subregional projects should designate one country or organisation to contract loans for implementation, a method that has worked successfully within the SADC countries.

The European Development Fund's (EDF) special regional fund would appear to be another hopeful sign on the funding side. It is currently being used for several interstate roads and for development of a transport "corridor" to help landlocked Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. But its regional funds still represent only a small proportion of total EDF development spending.

A similar conflict over national and international priorities is noted by ECA among African airlines.

"There remains a manifest lack of co-operation among African airlines in scheduling, establishing new routes within Africa, pooling arrangements and granting traffic rights to other African airlines," says ECA's report to Ministers.

ECA has also noted that some African countries have carried out or planned projects which do not appear in the Decade programme at all with a consequent reduction of national and international effort for the agreed programme. Failure of yet other countries to become involved in ECA's technical planning meetings and a dearth of regular up-to-date information also hamper the Commission in its overall task. The secretariat frankly admits that it has no established method of verifying the success of the decade.

Mangosela does not believe that the picture is entirely gloomy, however. It is

true, he admits, that important port projects, major highway routes, general improvement of trunk roads etc, would have happened in some countries with or without the decade. But a vital ECA function is to ensure that the whole value of, for example, the Trans-African Highway is not lost simply because of one weak link in the centre. ECA can press for funding for important sections in the poorest countries and the regular Transport Minister meetings organised by ECA ensure that the richer states realise the importance of throwing their weight behind appeals for help for the poorer countries. Ultimately, Nigeria and Kenya, for example, have much to gain from completion of the Mombasa-Lagos route.

Some countries were always sure to complete their section of the Mombasa-Lagos route speedily. But who, asks Mangosela, will ensure that Chad and Zaire get funds to complete their link?

Mombasa-Lagos is the first of five planned trans-African highways and was resolved as an ECA priority as long ago as 1971. The aim was to link the West and East African port cities, allowing movement of goods across the breadth of Africa and giving the landlocked states between easy access to foreign markets.

Under ECA's initiative, the Trans-African Highway Authority was established in 1981 with a headquarters based at Bangui in the Central African Republic — a decision based maybe more on CAR's central position and landlocked status rather than on the efficacy of trying to co-ordinate a road-planning and construction authority from one of Africa's poorest countries.

The plan is to have a high-quality all-weather bitumen-surfaced road the entire 8,275km route with major trunk feeder routes from adjacent countries. By December 1982, Kenya and Nigeria could boast 100% completion of their sections, Uganda 62%, Cameroon 40%, with CAR and Zaire 25% and 5% respectively. Clearly the speed with which national sections are completed has depended on the road's importance to the national economy of the country rather than general pan-African interest.

Kenya and Nigeria have both been vocal in criticising the proliferation of authorities and bureaucracy within ECA, a position which could appear to be based on the fact that they have clearly determined national transport plans and objectives of their own. But there is considerable weight behind their arguments.

Nigeria has pointed out that the growing number of consultative and planning committees to which member states are expected to contribute represents a serious drain on scarce

technical, human and financial resources. Five major highways are planned for 1990 and ECA initially envisaged that each would have its own Bangui-type secretariat, a philosophy firmly opposed by Kenya at an ECA meeting of Transport Ministers held in Cairo earlier this year.

The particular body under discussion was the Trans-East African Highway Authority which ECA hoped to establish to oversee the planned Cairo-Gaborone route. Kenya's representative made it clear that it could not support another highway authority, nor the idea of such an authority having the power to take decisions on routes and road standards which were properly the decision of the national governments concerned.

Kenya believed that a single authority should be established in Addis Ababa to cover all the trans-African routes planned or underway. It should have an advisory and co-ordinating function only. This position seems now to have been generally accepted by ECA and a proposal along these lines is now being put to all member states.

Mangoela accepts that much of the early work of ECA's transport secretariat in overseeing the Decade has of necessity been "putting the cart before the horse." He adds: "We are only now talking about an African master transport plan."

ECA's general report, covering the 25 years to 2008, makes it clear that transport planning has to go much beyond the Decade's already stated objectives. All ECA's other plans — industrialisation, food self-sufficiency and ultimately an African Common Market — depend on commensurate progress in transport. Roads and railways will be particularly significant says ECA.

"The success of the projected industrial take-off will depend on the capability of the region's transport network to transport raw and intermediate materials

among countries and distribute the finished products to the various consumption centres within the region."

The five planned trans-African highways are due to be completed by 1990 and ECA's long-term plans envisage an additional four: Tripoli-Windhoek ("in anticipation," says Mangoela); Nouakchott-Cairo; Dakar-Massawa; and Beira-Lobito. Development of feeder and rural access roads is also stressed.

A drastic departure from the present railway structure is essential, says ECA, with increased use of electrification using as yet undeveloped hydroelectric resources. An urgent task would be the harmonisation of stock and equipment and development of techniques to enable easy changes from one gauge to another. An additional 28,000km of track is projected with average speeds of 100km/hour by 2008.

But is there the cash for this even more ambitious programme? The costs of the Decade alone are formidable. Phase 1 was initially estimated to cost \$8.85bn, over 90% for transport, the remainder for telecommunications. By August 1982, the programme had been re-estimated to cost \$14.3bn while the financing secured was less than \$6bn. The unfinanced section of Phase 1 has now been carried forward to Phase 2 which will run from 1984-88. Its current price tag is over \$30bn, 86% of which is for transport.

Phase 2 was always expected to cost more than Phase 1, partly because projects only at planning stage during the first years would move to the more costly implementation stage later. But the cost increase also reflects the fact that major projects, unable to find backers in Phase 1, have now been carried forward. Furthermore, there is little sign that constraints on development spending that have operated during the last few years will be overcome in the near future. ■

PROBLEMS OF GRADUATE UNEMPLOYMENT HIGHLIGHTED

London WEST AFRICA in English 12 Sep 83 p 2123

[Text] THROUGHOUT developing Africa, the desire to land a white-collar job has led to what sociologists have called the Paper Qualification Syndrome: the view that it does not matter what you study so long as there is a diploma at the end, and that it is better to remain a perennial student than to finish without one.

As this "diploma disease" spreads among young Africans, the spectre of thousands of highly-educated, unemployable young people is beginning to haunt authorities across the continent where agriculture is still the backbone of most economies and the number of jobs available for diploma holders often falls short of the growing demand.

As long as a diploma remains the key to an interesting and well-paid career and agriculture continues to be a hard way of life with only minimal returns, this demand is likely to continue to grow, according to a recent study carried out in four countries of French-speaking West Africa under the ILO's Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa (JASPA).

The study* points out that white-collar jobs are concentrated in the modern sector — industry, highly qualified services and the State — which plays only a small part in the economies of the four countries visited by the mission team: Benin, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo.

For example, in the Ivory Coast — the most industrialised of the four countries — 68 per cent of the population of working age is engaged in agriculture and in Togo the proportion is 84 per cent, while the modern sector accounts for only 13 per cent of the workforce in Senegal and less than 4 per cent in Benin.

Salaries in government service are closely linked to qualifications, and in private industry, too, a diploma is virtually an essential condition for finding a job, the report says.

In Senegal a senior government official can earn 24 times as much as a worker in

the "informal sector" in urban areas and even the lowest-grade public employee earns five times as much as an informal sector worker. Small wonder then that the "diploma disease" shows signs of reaching epidemic proportions.

The study found, however, that at present unemployment among diploma holders is limited to perhaps a few thousand, but there is a marked imbalance between the types of jobs available and the employment people seek. Diploma holders look for administrative and commercial jobs, though this market is already saturated, and the number of jobs in public service is tending to shrink in all four countries, except for low-paid teaching posts.

In contrast, vacancies are unfilled in some technical areas and in the social sector. This mismatch is bound to grow in coming years, the report says, noting that the West African countries have individually taken positive steps, which nevertheless need to be expanded, to meet specific problems.

The Ivory Coast has begun setting up an information system on professional careers and has launched a study of career openings for students. A similar study is planned in Senegal and the two countries have joined in efforts to develop technical education, helped by a French research institute.

Financial incentives for teachers in scientific subjects were to be offered in the Ivory Coast and there were plans for mobile units to give vocational training to young people with only basic education and a similar project is planned in Togo.

Agriculture, however, remains the sector needing the most attention and Benin has already established experimental schools of practical education for this sector. The ILO is supporting agriculture-oriented projects, particularly in the Ivory Coast which has launched a scheme to encourage young people to settle in rural areas.

BLACK AFRICA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY ASSESSED

London WEST AFRICA in English 12 Sep 83 p 2112

[Article by Kevin Toolis: "How To Beat Apartheid?"]

[Text] THE DIVERSITY of military training, arms and communications equipment and the subsequent inability to form a unified African command would prevent black African states from launching an expeditionary force against South Africa without the aid of a major first-world power.

Speaking in London's Africa Centre, Prof. William Gutteridge, a military specialist from the International Studies Department at Aston University, Gt. Britain, said that if South Africa continued with their violent destabilisation policies "the threat to Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Botswana would be such that black Africa might try to do something to help."

But the launching of a unified military operation, even if led by Nigeria, would be beyond the present capabilities of African armies and doomed to failure. The primary function of African armies, Prof. Gutteridge emphasised, had been to maintain the local balance of power. They do not have the logistic capability to operate far from home.

Of crucial importance was the lack of transport aircraft. "The difficulty of technical support and pilot training" would be a major obstacle to any such operation. Helicopters, which have proved to be ideal weapons in other African troublespots, were also "notoriously difficult to maintain in tropical climates."

The lessons of UN intervention in the Congo in 1960 are still relevant. The central logistic problems of supplying the mixed UN force, with contingents drawn from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Ireland and India, proved almost insurmountable. In addition to the lack of proper

technical back-up and inadequate supply lines, the diverse nature of arms and equipment and the differing structures of the armies continually plagued the operation. Only the use of US, British and Soviet supply planes prevented a complete breakdown.

The problems of technical co-ordination would obviously be far greater in today's African armies. Both the increase in manpower from 400,000 in 1964 to current estimates of 800,000 in sub-Saharan Africa, and the disparate sources of weapons would create formidable difficulties for the military chiefs of a unified African command.

A major distinction must also be drawn in the hierarchical structures of the various African armies. Although the "elitist military style in Western and Soviet tradition with its privileged officer corps" is the model on which most African armies were based, there are also other "revolutionary-style" armies which have grown out of guerrilla movements.

The armies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Algeria and Mozambique are the product of national liberation movements and thus politically identified with the state, even if there is a tacit acceptance that Moscow is meeting the payroll. Unlike other colonial-style armies, such as in Nigeria or Ghana, these "revolutionary" armies owe their allegiance to the outside powers who funded and supplied their weapons during the liberation struggle. The more traditional style African armies tend to maintain close links with their former colonial power for both weapons and training.

Militarily, the most significant difference lies in the lack of guerrilla training of the

colonial-style forces. This essential difference in attitude and military outlook is yet another barrier to the formation of a unitary military force.

Commenting on these military divisions, Prof. Gutteridge pointed to current examples in Zimbabwe, where, unlike the rest of the army, the Fifth Brigade had been trained by the North Koreans. This obviously created tension and provoked internal hostility from the British-trained former guerrillas who make up the majority of Zimbabwe's 60,000-strong army.

South Africa's vast array of high-technology weapons and its geographical location must be taken into account in any military assessment. Its superior air power and resultant ability to strike at bases far beyond its borders would hinder large-scale traditional military operations. South Africa also had the capacity to sustain its present destabilisation campaigns in Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique for the foreseeable future, the Professor said. These operations and other covert incursions continued to weaken southern states preventing formation of guerrilla bases.

In the final analysis, it seemed very unlikely that an external attack on South Africa would be militarily possible even if the political will was there. If a first world power intervened, however, to provide aircraft, weaponry, and possibly troops, the military situation would change overnight.

But that seemed equally unlikely. The Russians would not commit their own forces so far from home against such overwhelming odds. And as Prof. Gutteridge noted, the estimated 27,000 Cubans in Angola are there to provide defence and training against South African incursions and not an "offensive role."

The ultimate attack on South Africa would be from within, through an escalating guerrilla war of economic destabilisation and urban "terrorism."

Professor Gutteridge concluded by warning of the dangers of African states becoming "pawns to the suppliers of military equipment". The spiralling arms trade both fuelled and benefited from inter-state rivalries.

CSO: 3400/39

BIG DEMAND FOR PORTUGUESE VISAS NOTED

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 18 Aug 83 p 1

[Text] Whoever read in yesterday's paper that Angolans are standing in line outside the Portuguese Embassy in Luanda to obtain entry visas into the country may have gotten the wrong impression that life in Angola is going so well that its citizens can afford the luxury of vacationing in Europe.

The truth, however, is altogether different. Life in this former Portuguese territory continues to be as difficult as it was in recent years, if not more so. Markets and stores are empty, and there is still a "struggle" every day to obtain food or clothing.

Everybody has quanzas and doesn't know what to do with them. Up to now the only recourse was to exchange the quanzas for foreign currency and in that way procure access to the few shops which have something for sale, but where payment is made in foreign currency.

The Angolans, however, have discovered that the devaluation of the escudo has led to this wonderful thing: while on the black market 10,000 quanzas will buy 1,000 escudos, on the official market 10,000 quanzas are worth the nice sum of 39,000 Portuguese escudos.

Moreover, people who are going abroad may exchange 20,000 quanzas, besides paying for their tickets in Luanda in local currency. The Angolans are quick to perceive the advantage of this deal: they can manage to go to Portugal with the neat amount of 78,000 escudos, paying out in exchange only 20,000 quanzas, which on the black market would give them nothing more than 2,000 escudos.

This explains the long lines outside the Portuguese Embassy in Luanda. An excellent deal is involved, and nobody wants to pass it up--as long as it lasts. The quanzas-escudos exchange is made at the National Bank of Angola, which gives out the traveller's checks already in Portuguese escudos. Thus it is not surprising that the TAP planes are leaving Luanda full...

Despite this, according to an authorized source, the embassy is considering the idea of reducing the outflow of "tourists," because many of them also want to take advantage of the possibility of leaving Angola and not returning, at least as long as the MPLA Marxist regime is in power and the civil war lasts. This war has already destroyed what was one of the richest lands in black Africa.

9805

CSO: 3442/333

THREE MILLION DOLLAR CREDIT AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL SIGNED

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] An agreement for a \$3 million credit to our country was signed in Praia last July 13th, by the Bank of Brazil, represented by the country's commerce minister, Fernando Buarqut Franco Netto, and by the Republic of Cape Verde. The minister of economy and finance, Commander Osvaldo Lopes da Silva, signed on behalf of our country, and later made a statement stressing the particular importance Cape Verde attaches to Brazilian aid and referring to the difficulties and constraints Brazil is facing.

This contract is being signed at a time when our country has just concluded negotiations with Brazil involving the national fuel enterprise, ENACOL, and PETROGAS, and leading to an \$8 million dollar transaction. The two countries have already made significant steps forward in strengthening relations, with economic agreements added to their political relations, which have been excellent throughout the few years since we gained independence.

The credit extended under the new agreement will be used to finance imports of Brazilian equipment, to be brought in by the Cape Verde Ministry of Transportation and Communication, through the General Directorate of the Postal Service, to implement the project designed to extend the modernize telecommunications networks in Praia and Mindelo.

The telecommunications project became necessary and possible after our country won another battle, namely control of our air space, a battle in which we can count on Brazil's firm support.

In his short but eloquent statement, Cape Verde's economy and finance minister recognized Brazil's political will to develop ties of cooperation with our country, expressed his desire to see these objectives materialize, and indicated that Cape Verde was ready to help promote the excellent relations between the two countries.

Mr Fernando Netto, for his part, said that his country was entering a new stage of cooperation with Cape Verde, which he said was much more ambitious. The Brazilian commerce minister indicated later on that Brazil was proud to be Cape Verde's development partner.

Present at the ceremony were the Cape Verde minister of transportation and communications, Commander Herculano Vieira, the secretary-general of the Transportation Ministry, Omar Lima, the director-general of the postal service, Marida Sagua, and various other members of the Party and the government.

9805

CSO: 3442/333

COOPERATION AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH FRANCE

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 12 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] On the 6th of this month, Cape Verde and France signed the fourth agreement of the "radiophonic equipment modernization" project initiated in 1975, under which Cape Verde will receive a grant valued at 4.2 million French francs.

The main purpose of this agreement, signed by Jose Brito, state secretary for cooperation and planning, and by the French ambassador to Cape Verde, Jacques Bertrand, is to provide further assistance to the communications sector in Cape Verde, a sector in which France has been particularly interested.

Under the accord, this friendly country is going to install four frequency modulation transmitters in Santiago, Santo Antao, S. Nicolau and Fogo, thereby completing the radio project. According to the document, France decided to support Cape Verde's experimental television project, in addition to providing study grants under its technical assistance program.

During a brief statement made in the presence of the French diplomat, Jose Brito said that Cape Verde is highly appreciative of the ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, and added that he hoped they would be furthered and strengthened in the coming years.

The radio, earth station and television, all projects that France has helped start and develop, were referred to by the state secretary.

For his part, French Ambassador Jacques Bertrand said that France intended to expand its technology, the cornerstone of French policy. Jacques Bertrand also referred to relations between the two countries. He was accompanied by the new head of cooperation at the French Embassy in Praia.

9805

CSO: 3442/333

COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH SA--The Comoros nest of mercenaries is in the news again. It is believed that at least one of Hissen Habré's foreign assistants in Chad comes direct from the islands, taken over by the mercenary Bob Denard in 1978. Others are keen to get in on the act: Australia is prosecuting six for trying to oust Comoros' President Abdallah--and presumably his backer Denard--last year. Now we believe the Comoros Government is on the point of establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa. A weekly flight to Moroni was introduced by South African Airways in July as an extension of the present service between Johannesburg and Blantyre, which is operated by a Boeing 737. South Africa is also getting ready to pour R23m into the Comoro tourist industry and to send agricultural and fishing experts there. The groundwork for this was laid by two secret Comoro delegations to South Africa early in 1983. According to a Paris-based newsletter the Comoro delegation was headed by the President's principal private secretary. At the beginning of February, Bob Denard, the main mercenary who helped President Abdallah take power in May 1978, arrived from South Africa accompanied by a senior South African officer and spent two weeks there. The second Comoro delegation comprised the Foreign Minister as well as another very high-ranking Comoro official. Financial problems and the reluctance of Saudi Arabia and France, the Comoros' traditional aid donors, to assist it have been given as the reasons for this sudden flutter of activity. However, a recent book, "Chimurenga" published in South Africa and dealing with the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, claims that the Rhodesians provided logistic support for the 1978 coup because they needed the Comoros for end-user certificates for illegal arms shipments. The coup forces were in daily radio contact with Salisbury. Denard now spends a lot of time in South Africa and contacts made in previous years are coming in useful for the South Africans. [Text] [London AFRICA NOW in English Sep 83 p 13]

CSO: 3400/39

AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL SEEN AS PROVEN, DEVELOPING

Djibouti LA NATION in French 1 Sep 83 p 3

[Article: "Agriculture--A Dynamic Has Been Sparked!"]

[Text] On Saturday 27 August, the minister of agriculture, Ahmed Hassan Liban (known as "Gohad"), carried out the distribution of parcels of land in the Atar pilot area.

People arrived at Atar after traversing the plains of Douddah and going beyond the town of Damerjoog, 17 km south of the city of Djibouti. On Saturday, 8 hectares were distributed among 32 peasants, and each will have a surface area to work equal to 2,500 m². This is the second agricultural experiment launched in a 4-year period.

Technicians, engineers and future assignees of parcels of land have worked laboriously to install the irrigation system and to build the structures that today make it possible for 32 farmer families to settle in. The government has, indeed, purposely called for married peasants with children to work the land in this locality.

These peasants will not subsequently be left to their own devices; in an initial phase, they will receive food aid granted by the ONARS [expansion unknown]. And they will also be advised and supervised by technicians of the Agriculture Service, until the area is placed in service. Finally, it should be pointed out that it has been necessary to allocate a credit of 27 million Djibouti francs for preparation of the Atar pilot area, with the financing furnished jointly by the EDF [European Development Fund], the ONARS and the Djiboutian government.

A Desire for Independence

The Atar agricultural area, like that of Mouloud and PK 20, expresses the government's desire for the country to achieve self-sufficiency in food. In the immediate future, though, including the short term, its aim is to upgrade the incomes of the populations concerned, and in the long term, to reduce food dependence on the outside for the republic as a whole. The effect of this will be a positive repercussion on the balance of payments.

Indeed, the more we import from abroad for our essential needs, the greater our foreign-exchange impoverishment becomes.

Net Increase in Production: from 0.6 to 6 Percent of Domestic Consumption

Until 1977, Djibouti managed to cover barely 0.6 percent (0.58 percent) of its food needs, essentially in market-garden products. Today this figure has risen to 6 percent, or 10 times as much, in a period of nearly 7 years. Isn't that spectacular progress? Especially for a land often called thankless in this regard! Didn't those who do not restrain their flights of lyricism say that we had a lunar soil or landscape? All this is false; it is now proven beyond a doubt that our land can produce, provided that it is worked with conviction and love.

On the periphery of our capital, aren't the gardeners of Ambouli proving what is being asserted here? They have been living for generations on the produce from their gardens! On the other hand, when one looks at a piece of land with ambitions of immediate profitability, for creating multimillionaires, then one is quite simply disappointed. Like this report dating from 19 November 1959 and prepared at the request of the authorities of that time; it states: "Several agricultural-development studies are under way, particularly for the Hanle plain, in the wadi of Sadai, in the coastal plain between Djibouti and Loyada." Until 1977, these "development studies" remained a dead letter: nothing concrete was engendered by the studies!

But even as early as 1905, in the Douddah plain, the peasants of the region were growing cotton; and which of you, dear readers, knew that? History does not, however, explain to us why these peasants were "gathered up" and thrown into city life, to constitute the class of "boys" and "coolies." Who did that? Guess, my friend! Why did it do it? Because by producing on their own, those peasants were becoming "independent." And when the virus called independence affects a lot of people....

Djibouti Can Produce

But let us get back to our subject! Are the Djiboutian climate, its land, its people, refractory to everything agricultural? Let us look at what is cultivated on our land, what comes out of its entrails. At Ambouli, as well as everywhere else that an attempt has been made to work it. In the cold season, for vegetables: tomatoes, radishes, turnips, gambos, pimento (three varieties), egg plant, squash, pumpkins, parsley, lettuces, carrots, white beets, red beets, onions and also watercress.

For fruits: pomegranates, mangoes, guavas, mandarins (three varieties); and it should also be noted that in certain farming operations there can be more than 10, even 15, different species of trees and shrubs. At the beginning of this article, we spoke of the spectacular progress (from 0.6 to 6 percent) in 7 years. Imagine that if these projects had begun 20 years earlier, wouldn't our vegetable and fruit needs be 70-percent satisfied today? Or in any case, wouldn't we have approached that figure? We have a myth among us: that of having come into the world in a desert country, a country where, according to

a few adventurers who wanted to perk up the accounts of their travels through our territory, "the jackal himself writes his will."

Like all myths, it is absolutely false! Today, let us listen rather to the president of the republic:

"An end has finally been put to the legend of the sterility of our soil.... To instruct, to take care, have until the present been the objectives of our action; henceforth, a third will be added: to produce."

This speech was delivered by President Gouled at the first harvest of PK 20, on 22 April 1982! In agriculture, no matter what the defeatists may say, a dynamic has been sparked!

11267
CSO: 3419/1198

PROGRESS IN ROAD SYSTEM, AGRICULTURE REPORTED

National Army Improving Roads

Djibouti LA NATION in French 1 Sep 83 p 3

[Article: "Repair of the Roads"]

[Text] Before its primary role of defense of the homeland, the National Army works for development of the national economy. The Holl and Kabah-Kabah tracks are now very practicable.

As with any country in the world, the economic takeoff of the Republic of Djibouti is closely linked to development of the lines of communication. And in particular, this is also the best means for development of the back-country regions.

The infrastructure of the national road network is composed predominantly of tracks, with only about 257 km of tarred roads (not including the city of Djibouti, with 60 km), 160 km of which has been built by the government since 1977, the year of the country's independence. This negligence about construction of tarred roads before independence appears to be due to the fact that the colonial administration, not concerned about the economic needs of the inhabitants, was content with development of the coast, where its ships leaving for the Asian colonies would call.

In the back country, only tracks for penetration by military columns were planned for. But even so, the dirt roads as a whole suffered from a lack of maintenance. Thus the very sensitive roads have deteriorated especially from the onslaughts of the military materiel, often creating very deep ruts. In addition, rainwater accentuates their deterioration. This is the reason why a great many localities, especially those of the mountainous regions of the north, are difficult of access. For the responsible officials of the four districts, this represents an enormous obstacle that impedes their administrative efforts in these out-of-the-way regions.

That is why, on the initiative of the chief of the Ali-Sabieh district and the general command of the armed forces, the tracks of the southern region have recently been reconditioned. In effect, the Holl-Holl-to-Kabah-Kabah and the

Holl-Holl-to-Biyadeh road trunks are now practicable. This is by the efforts of more than 200 soldiers of the Military School of Holl-Holl, who, under the leadership of Captain Adou, in charge of that school, did the work to improve those rural roads from 2 to 6 August.

These soldiers--new recruits, with their water-bottles on their belts--did this work with the help of two trucks and a loader, along with shovels, picks, sledge hammers and explosives.

And for the first time, the National Army has thus affirmed the role that was assigned to it by the chief of state: that is, before defense of the homeland, to participate in the building of the national economy. "We want this to become an example for the whole of the country, in order for road communications to have high priority," declared M. Salah, the district chief, at the Royaleh project camp at the conclusion of the work. "What the National Army--the Military School in particular--has just undertaken is a great help to the nomads of the entire region, who will benefit from permanent contact and rapid medical aid."

This first social operation by the National Army proves that development of the national road network is indispensable for the economic takeoff of the back country, and not only by the fact of its flexibility, its convenience and its autonomy. It should be mentioned once again that the communication routes remain the only primary element for stopping the rural exodus to the capital and for balancing the economic and social development of the country as a whole.

Nomads Make Agricultural Progress in Desert Country

Djibouti LA NATION in French 1 Sep 83 p 3

[Article: "Holl-Holl--When the Nomads Discover Agriculture"]

[Text] After the agricultural experiment of Mouloud, the Holl-Holl region is laying down a challenge--first of all, to be self-sufficient in market-garden products, and later, to sell them. This is the great desire of the Ali-Sabieh district chief.

Four years ago, Mouloud was a desert expanse, calcinated by an implacable sun and swept by a hot wind. And this expanse, a few kilometers from the principal town of the Dikhil district, had received a wave of nomads who had suffered decimation of their livestock as the result of a drought.

A prospering village, constantly expanding, a school, and some very extensive fields--such, in 1983, is the new visage of Mouloud, which today has become the first leading agricultural center belonging to growers who market their products not only in Ali-Sabieh and Dikhil but also in the market of the capital.

The commissioner of the Republic, M. Salah, the Ali-Sabieh district chief, is presently concerned about a project like this. This time, though, his objective is to carry out the same experiment in the locality of Holl-Holl, in the

south of the country. Didn't it, like Mouloud in 1979, receive disaster-stricken nomads? Introducing these nomads to the techniques of agriculture while at the same time furnishing equipment and technical aid to them is the only way for these nomads to meet their needs and achieve self-sufficiency.

This has already been done, since the growers of Mouloud are former nomads. This is the great desire of the district chief, who, with a very confident tone, declares: "I have given them milk, and now it is up to them to make butter out of it." To begin with, the disaster victims and a few villagers had at their disposal an area of 2 to 3 hectares that they have cleared, and they are now doing the last work before the first plowing. As for irrigation, it poses no problem, for it will be drawn from a well currently being sunk by the villagers. And what is more, water is accessible with a few swings of a pick.

Thus, all the conditions have been fulfilled in order for the Djiboutains of the capital to find, after Mouloud, vegetables and fruits "Made in Holl-Holl." An old legend--"Djibouti, a desert country"--is tending to disappear.

11267

CSO: 3419/1198

CONCEPT OF MARSHALL-PLAN AID FOR AFRICA SUGGESTED

Dakar AFRICA in French Aug-Sep 83 pp 29-31

[Article by Guimo Tikessou: "A Marshall Plan for Africa?"]

[Text] Reference to the Marshall Plan reappears with each crisis, presented as the only remedy, the only possible alternative¹ to the economic and social evils engendered by the crisis. There was even talk, at the time of the monetary crisis of 1973, of a "Marshall Plan for the United States" in order to save the dollar, presented by its author² as a "reverse Marshall Plan" which "would mark the gratitude of the countries that the United States aided, after World War II, by the extraordinarily generous contribution that the first Marshall Plan constituted."

Today, there are calls³ for the establishment "of a sort of Marshall Plan for Africa that would stimulate the cooperation of the Western industrialized countries--North America, Europe and Japan--for development of the African continent."

Before reflecting on what Africa could hope for from such a plan, let us review what the model was and the circumstances in which it came into being.

The end of the war in 1945 saw Europe terribly reduced. It lost 40 to 50 million persons, not counting those who disappeared and the millions of wounded. The material losses were commensurate with the human losses. Never had a conflict caused so much ruin. Entire regions were ravaged, cities were destroyed almost completely. The port, rail and road infrastructures were unusable. The entire production apparatus (agriculture, industry, commerce) had to be put back into service. The specter of famine hovered over Europe, where the food supply for 340 million persons was, at that time, below 2,000 calories per day, the threshold of malnutrition.

Furthermore, Europe came out of the conflict divided. The two great victors in the war, the United States and the Soviet Union, extended their influence--the former over West Europe and the latter over East Europe--and kept a jealous eye on their respective zones of influence.

Europe after World War II

The ideological oppositions in Greece resulted in a civil war, setting the members of the communist resistance and the monarchical government at each other's throats, starting in 1944. On 12 March 1947, the American president Harry Truman asked the Congress to approve aid in the amount of \$400 million to help the Greek government, as well as Turkey, which was threatened by territorial claims being made by the Soviet Union. This American commitment corresponded to certain political objectives. In Truman's mind, it was a matter of supporting "the free peoples who were resisting the temptations to submission presented by armed minorities or by external pressures"; in other words, it was a matter of stemming the progress of the Soviet Union.

It was in this context of economic difficulties and political rivalries that the plan proposed by George C. Marshall fell. George Marshall was secretary of state when he delivered, at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, a speech that was an extension of Truman's speech. Convinced that the Soviet government "was coldly determined to exploit the condition in which a defenseless Europe found itself in order to propagate communism," Marshall proposed financial aid to all the European countries in order to help them revive their economy. This was to be the European Recovery Program. He tried hard to assert that his proposal was not directed "against any doctrine or any country but rather against hunger, poverty, chaos"; but the communist countries rejected it, while 16 Western countries⁴ accepted the emergency aid of Summer 1947 and on 16 April 1948 set up a new organization, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to provide for distribution of the American gifts and credits among them, for the aid was given to Europe as such, and it was up to the Europeans to take care of the distribution themselves.

Europe was thus to receive, from 3 April 1948 to 30 June 1951, the considerable sum of about \$10 billion, 5/6 of which was provided in the form of gifts and 1/6 in the form of long-term loans. Europe actually received far more than that, since the United States had already given financial aid before application of the Marshall Plan, and it continued to aid it after the theoretical end of the Plan in June 1951. The principal beneficiary countries were Great Britain (26 percent), France (20 percent), the FRG (11 percent⁵), Italy (10 percent), Belgium and Luxembourg (5.2 percent). They used this aid to re-establish their economies: the FRG used it to finance its transformation industry and rapidly develop its sales abroad, and France, for its part, used it mainly for long-term investments in heavy industries. As of 1950, the national production of the European countries had reached its prewar value, and the objectives of the Plan were achieved.

The American action was unprecedented in the history of the world, and the amplitude of the gifts cannot be minimized, particularly because they were offered both to the conquered (Germany, Italy, Austria) and to the victors in the war. But while it is indisputable that without the American aid, Europe would not have been able to achieve such a fast recovery by itself, it is also indisputable that the United States likewise derived great profit from it. Not only did it have a right to oversee the use of the funds, but the American economy itself was stimulated by the supplying of agricultural and industrial

products to Europe, and freedom of trade exchange was strengthened within the dollar zone. But in particular, the advantages on the political and military levels were considerable for the United States.

Certain countries put a part of the credits into operations that coincided with American interests, as did France by fighting Ho Chi Minh's communist guerrillas in Indochina. Finally, thanks to this Marshall aid and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, starting in 1949, grouped the same countries in a joint-defense pact, the United States held the leadership of the Western world in the face of the Soviet bloc.

The comparison that can be made between the Europe of 1947 and the Africa of today brings out a few points in common. The first observation: the African economy is not holding up well. The reasons for this are numerous and well-known. They are related first of all to the state of underdevelopment of the African continent, characterized by underindustrialization inherited from the colonial past, the predominance of a rural sector with low productivity, a situation of economic subordination, mainly in the area of trade exchanges and capital. The first decade of independence saw some progress in a number of African countries, such as the Ivory Coast: there, the process of industrialization has been launched, agricultural production has been diversified, the high proportion of illiteracy is being brought down, and the endemic diseases are yielding ground.

Unfortunately, these transformations, which are unequal in scope from one state to another, have been jeopardized almost everywhere by climatic and economic accidents of planetary dimension, such as the drought and the economic recession starting in 1974, which have added their effects to the consequences of the population explosion. Under the combined effect of these numerous factors, there has been an acceleration of the process of proletarianization. The rural areas, hit by the natural calamities (drought, plagues of locusts, brushfires) and the rural exodus of young people who leave for the towns or the plantation regions, can no longer cope with the constantly growing demand for food products. The peasants themselves can no longer provide for their own needs. It has become a rule for civil servants leaving for a village to fill the trunks of their cars with sacks of rice and other products of basic necessity, and city-dwellers who are not in a position to contribute such aid prefer not to set foot in the village.

For a decade now, the gap between food needs and food production has been widening by 3 percent a year in Africa, overall. This deficit obliges the states to turn to food aid and import increasingly large quantities of food products --in particular, massive quantities of cereals--which are a heavy burden on their budgets.

The Third World's Concerns and Money Aid

This food deficit threatens to grow worse, since, according to the experts of all continents, it is the African continent that at the end of the century will be experiencing the highest natural growth. Africa is expected to go from 400 million inhabitants in 1975 to 800 million at the end of the century

and around 2 billion toward the middle of the 21st century. It is only as from the years 2050-2075 that its population growth should slow down.

As for the cities, whose rate of growth has been 6 to 7 percent since 1960--with Abidjan, for its part, growing at the rate of 11.5 percent, or 100,000 more citizens per year--it is obvious that they cannot provide for their needs by relying on an overcrowded and unprofitable tertiary sector, and still less on the secondary sector, when one realizes that in 1980 the entirety of the developing countries accounted for less than 10 percent of world industrial production. Nevertheless, these cities continue to attract the peasant populations and the foreigners from the poorest countries, who crowd, without resources, into the shantytowns, where the situation is even more precarious than in the European cities devastated by World War II: makeshift housing, rutted streets, lack of water, electricity, modern sanitation, etc. Three-fourths of the inhabitants of certain African capitals are concentrated in these slums. Located next to the nice neighborhoods, they make even more stark the very furious social inequalities that characterize most of the countries of Africa.

In recent years, the daily difficulties of the life of the most deprived have engendered an acute social crisis in various places, engendering a political crisis in turn. Coups d'etat are no longer the appanage of the Latin American continent; Africa is hardly trailing in this area. Likewise, mainly at the time of the decolonization of the former Portuguese colonies, it has become a field of confrontation between the two blocs.

This situation, considered a serious one today and even more disturbing for the future, has aroused reactions on the part of the countries directly involved and the developed countries. At Bandung in 1955, some 30 countries of the Third World expressed, along with their political demands, a number of economic demands, citing the urgency of the creation of a United Nations Fund for Economic Development, and allocation by the World Bank of a greater part of its resources to Africa and Asia. Even then, the conference's final communique demanded stabilization of the prices of raw materials, expansion of the domain of trade, and unilateral payments.

These demands were widely expressed also within the framework of the United Nations, in its numerous specialized institutions, and in particular, as of 1964, within the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), or the "Group of 77," which actually numbered more than a hundred; it was very active in calling for a modification of international trade so as to increase the share of the Third World countries, especially in world trade in industrial products. The "Group of 77" fought for the effective establishment of a new world economic order based, as was just stated, on a reorganization of international trade, a market-stabilization system, a reorganization of the monetary system and, in a general way, better redistribution of the means in line with the needs.

Outside the United Nations, the European organisms such as the EEC, as of 1962, and the OPEC countries, starting in 1976, have been making their contribution. In toto, what has been done so far, within the framework of the

international institutions, on a world scale or from continent to continent, is far from negligible. It is even becoming difficult for a nonspecialist to evaluate the precise volume of the aid furnished over a number of years in the form of loans or gifts by all the public and private organizations. An organization such as the IDA, a subsidiary of the World Bank, has even specialized, since its creation in 1960, in the granting of loans to the world's most deprived countries, whose GNP per inhabitant was less than \$800 in 1980. Its long-term loans are granted on very liberal conditions (50-year payback, very low interest rates) and are invested mainly in agriculture, rural development and basic infrastructure. Finally, the IDA leans particularly toward the African countries south of the Sahara, many of which are among the world's least-advanced countries (GNP per inhabitant less than \$400 in 1981), and intends to reserve 30 percent of its funds for them for the period 1982-1986. The distribution of the IDA's funds by sector does not contradict the content of the "Lagos Action Plan for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000," which was prepared at the conclusion of the economic summit of African chiefs of state meeting in Nigeria in April 1980 and which places emphasis on agricultural development and food self-sufficiency.

So, since the total aid is sizable, and does not overlook the poorest, where does the feeling of dissatisfaction prevailing in Africa come from? It is connected first of all with the fact that despite the exhortations of the United Nations, the ratio between public aid for development and the Gross National Product of the developed countries remains below the objective set. The objective taken by the United Nations in 1970, at the start of the second development decade, was to achieve 0.7 percent between that time and 1980. But the situation as of 1980 showed that the results were very far from the objective: apart from a few countries such as those of OPEC (1.45 percent), Sweden (0.76 percent) and The Netherlands (between 0.93 and 0.82 percent since 1976), most of the wealthy countries of this world put out far less (0.62 percent for France, 0.43 percent for the FRG, 0.32 percent for Japan, 0.27 percent for the United States, 0.14 percent for the Soviet Union, etc). While countries such as France and Japan have decided to make an effort to increase their participation, the trend of the other countries is to revise theirs downward.

Furthermore, apart from countries such as The Netherlands, whose aid is granted mainly in the form of gifts (81 percent of total commitments), especially vis-a-vis the LLDC's [least-developed countries], for which gifts may reach 100 percent, disinterested aid is nil or extremely small. We are therefore very far from the spirit of the Marshall Plan, which greatly favored gifts over loans. And whereas Europe, thanks to the Plan, recovered its prosperity rapidly, one does not see Africa doing the same. On the contrary, the burden of servicing the external debt sometimes exceeds, in our day, its capacity for repayment. It is estimated that more than half of the new financing needs of the developing countries for the period 1975-1985 must go for payment of interest and debt amortization. The situation had become so difficult for them that in 1978 the group of wealthy countries of UNCTAD decided to cancel certain debts of the least-developed countries.

As for the Independent Commission on the Problems of International Development, chaired by former chancellor Willy Brandt, it judged in its report for 1980, presented to the then secretary general of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, that "in the extreme cases, the gap is so wide that the peoples seem to live in different worlds." The report, which concluded that the problems had got worse, was echoed widely at the time of the Cancun Conference in Mexico in October 1981. The Brandt Commission, which is still functioning, places emphasis, in a recent report, on the desperate lot of the DC's [developing countries] and the urgency of increased aid to the countries with a high rate of debt.

But what form should this aid take in order not to make the debt situation of the DC's worse? The first Brandt report recommended supplemental aid on the order of \$1 billion per year for the DC's for the next two decades by way of subsidies or very liberal guaranteed long-term loans. More recently, the Commission asked the states of the East to increase their contribution, and the United States to be "the conscious leader of the world community." Isn't this an invitation for it to take on the same role as in 1947, at the time when it urged a new economic doctrine widely expressed by various American personalities in the course of 1981--a doctrine encouraging trade and private investment rather than direct public aid? The slogan "Trade but not aid" is doubtlessly an exaggerated one, since, in nominal value, the sums allocated to the DC's by the United States still put it in the No 1 position in the world. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the Third World countries, it appears, in our day, to be one of the countries least sensitive to their requests.

Furthermore, the DC's do not want to be considered beggars who are given charity in the form of a few credits. They want to "get beyond the fetishism of figures and obsession with aid percentages."⁶ What they especially want is all-encompassing negotiations among the groups of countries and associations, on the order of what has begun among the EEC-ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific countries], bearing on all the problems at the same time: the food problem, raw materials, energy, trade, financial problems, monetary problems, etc --indeed, a complete reorganization of international relations going far beyond the objectives of the Marshall Plan of 1947.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Marshall Plan or Great Crisis?," by Maurice Laure, president of the Societe Generale, in LE MONDE of 4 March 1981.
2. Jacques Rueff, of the French Academy, "A Marshall Plan for the United States," LE MONDE of 22 February 1973.
3. Henri Konan Bedie, president of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, "The Potential for Economic Cooperation with Africa," European Management Forum symposium of 2 February 1983 in Davos.
4. The 16 countries are the following: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, The Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. [as published]

5. The three western zones of Germany benefited from the Marshall Plan starting in 1948.
6. Abdoulaye Ndiaga Sylla, LE SOLEIL of Dakar, quoted in LE MONDE of 16 October 1981.

11267

CSO: 3419/1207

BRIEFS

TADJOURAH WATER PLANT--Thursday 15 January 1981 was the day on which the president of the republic, Al Hadj Hassan Gouled Aptidon, dedicated the Tadjourah Water Plant. It is the country's first industrial achievement. After suffering severe competition from waters from foreign sources, after having to deal with the prejudices of the local consumers, the Tadjourah bottle has succeeded in winning a place in the national market by virtue of its ratio of quality to price (FD [Djiboutian francs] 120). For the first time since its creation 3 years ago, the company commercializing the waters of Tadjourah expects to make a profit of FD 40 million, whereas the forecasts at this level were for FD 25 million. In the first 2 years it had a sizable deficit, due to a lack of expertise in the management of the company, on account of the fact that it is the first of its type in Djibouti, and also because of the problems posed for transport of cartons of water bottles from PK 20 (at Tadjourah) to the capital (100 cartons out of every 1,000 were damaged). Some of these problems have now been solved entirely, and others, partially. The credit goes to the company's managers, who have succeeded in providing rapid solutions, methodical and adequate, for them. [Text] [Djibouti LA NATION DE DJIBOUTI in French 8 Sep 83 p 1] 11267

CSO: 3419/1207

MINISTER OF ECONOMY FAVORS COOPERATION WITH PORTUGAL

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 3 Sep 83 p 9

[Text] Freire Monteiro the Guinea-Bissau economy and finance minister, on an 11-day visit to Portugal, has admitted that a "mini round table" sponsored by countries of the European Economic Community, has been agreed upon.

Minister Freire Monteiro further said that the projected meeting may be held in the latter part of October and that Sweden and the Netherlands will take part in it.

Since last Tuesday Freire Monteiro has been in Lisbon on a working visit and he has been maintaining direct contact with members of the Portuguese Government within the framework of the cooperation existing between the two countries.

In Lisbon, Freire Monteiro advocated making cooperation work in both directions, "giving and receiving in enduring ways."

The economy minister has already been received in audience by Jaime Gama, the Portuguese foreign minister and by Gaspar da Silva, state secretary for cooperation.

The Guinea-Bissau minister also defended three-cornered cooperation such as the kind that permits a Portuguese enterprise to construct a new high school in Bissau with Dutch capital.

He divulged that Luis Sanca, the Guinea-Bissau secretary of state for planning and internal cooperation, will go to Portugal to discuss specific subjects in his area with his Portuguese counterparts.

Freire Monteiro acknowledged having exchanged impressions with Jaime Gama about Guinea-Bissau President Bernardo Vieira's trip to Lisbon in late October. He will discuss the matter with the president before the latter leaves for Portugal.

Freire Monteiro will deal principally with affairs related to commercial and banking contacts between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau. He will also meet with Portuguese President Ramalho Eanes for a courtesy visit.

State Secretary Gaspar da Silva said after his meeting with Freire Monteiro that relations between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau were progressing "excellently" and that it was necessary to find means of financing and, with imagination, new methods of cooperation.

Portuguese Aid

In the meantime, the World Bank has granted a preliminary grant of \$1 million so that Portugal can help Guinea-Bissau restructure some ministries Freire Monteiro said.

The International Monetary Fund and the Netherlands are also participating in the financing to enable Guinea-Bissau to get technical advice in Portugal, the minister said. He had come to Lisbon to discuss a number of questions related to commercial and banking contacts between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau.

One of Freire Monteiro's goals is to raise the blockade on questions related to existing credits.

For nearly a year Portuguese technical personnel have been being contacted to go to Guinea-Bissau to work on the reconstruction of ministries. Some are going for 2 years and some for shorter periods.

12,116

CSO: 3442/346

MINISTERS DISMISSED FOR POLITICAL REASONS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 27 Aug 83 p 12

[Editorial by Xavier de Figueiredo]

[Text] The recent dismissal of three important figures of the Bissau regime does not appear to have been just a simple disciplinary measure for the purpose of improving the ethics of an administration whose demeanor has in fact been affected by the occurrence of "serious irregularities"--an expression that means, in the Guinea-Bissau official terminology, corruption and abuse of power. More than that, the purpose must have been either to remove from the area of power persons who, in some cases for political differences and in other cases for personal disputes, constitute fulcrums for shaky internal cohesion and instability in the regime.

Among those affected, Foreign Minister Samba Lamine Mane, Public Works Minister Manuel Saturnino da Costa and Joao da Silva, chief of the general staff of the armed forces, are very important--all of them members of the Revolutionary Council instituted following the November 1980 coup d'etat, in which all three occupied important positions. The other terminated personnel are all second level and in the opinion of a Guinea-Bissau source, were included in the removals to deaden the effects of the principal dismissals and provide the overall appearance that the government has sought to give to the case since, as far as they are concerned, they seem to be involved only in cases of corruption.

New Internal Tensions

In the interpretations being traded around in the political arena the preponderant causes of the principal dismissals are based on the coincidence in time between the dismissals and the appearance of new internal tensions, which some sources attribute more to personal struggles than to political or ideological differences. In the public rumors Samba Lamine and Manuel Saturnino were generally indicated as the principal "agents" of those struggles and differences. Relevance is also attributed to the fact that at least in the case of Samba Lamine the "serious irregularities" now invoked for his dismissal have been more or less known for a long time, to the point of being related to his passage through the Ministry of Natural Resources, which he left over a year ago.

Conspiratorial Climate

Ever since the coup d'etat that unseated former President Luis Cabral, Guinea-Bissau has undergone more or less cyclical crisis, fed by the fluctuations of a climate described as "conspiratorial." It is known that just a little more than 2 months ago President Bernardo Vieira took up the subject with special harshness in a meeting of the PAIGC leadership and that it was apparently because of a certain internal instability that he decided to postpone a visit to Portugal planned for September. The difference between the earlier crises and the current one is that for the first time recourse has been made to an ostentatious dismissal of leaders who on other occasions would only have been reassigned.

The Strong Man

The initiative for the current dismissals, sanctioned by President Bernardo Vieira, originated with Prime Minister Vitor Saude Maria, a man who seems to be influencing the regime more and more and who has come out of those proceedings in what is considered to be a strengthened position. Manuel Saturnino and Samba Lamine were considered to be very close to President Bernardo Vieira (the latter more than the former) while between the two former ministers, identified as "leftist" and the prime minister a moderate, relations on the personal level were not of the best. Immediately after getting the president's approval for the dismissals, Vitor Saude Maria left for a vacation in Yugoslavia, a gesture indicating his strength and tranquility.

What remains to be known--and where the expectations aroused by the case are to be found--is whether by sacrificing three of his most important men in the name of unity and cohesion that will protect it from surprises, the regime has not rather opened foci of perhaps more dangerous tensions. If the cases of Samba Lamine and Joao da Silva cannot be considered exemplary in this context, this does not appear to be the case with Manuel Saturnino, who is, after President Bernardo Vieira, the most popular figure in the country, both on the level of the common people and in the armed forces. After the coup d'etat, in which he was one of the participants, he became interior minister, controlling security and the police. Later, in the series of events of a crisis, he was transferred to the no-longer-existing portfolio of public works.

Saturnino in Lisbon

It is even symptomatic that the mildest of all the sanctions now announced has been applied to Saturnino: he was only suspended, while all the others were dismissed. When the measure affecting him was announced, Manuel Saturnino was in Lisbon, where he had arrived several days earlier on his way from Congo to his own country. He is still in Lisbon, after a delay in his return to Bissau, originally anticipated for last Wednesday. Although his whereabouts are known, it has not been possible to overcome his reluctance to speak about the matter.

Guinea-Bissau sources in Lisbon are also facing the possibility that new dismissals of high Guinea-Bissau functionaries may be announced in a few days and that later, at least a broad restructuring of the government will take place. Leonel Vieira, the current Guinea-Bissau ambassador in Lisbon, is one of the men who assuredly will be part of a new government, probably occupying a new portfolio: labor.

12,116
CSO: 3442/346

AMBASSADOR REBUTS GHANAIAN TIMES EDITORIAL

Monrovia DAILY OBSERVER in English 12 Sep 83 pp 1, 8

[Text]

The Liberian Ambassador in Ghana, Winiwah Wilson, has made it plain to Ghana that long before that country gained independence from Britain in 1957, Liberia was a sovereign state capably formulating its own policies according to her needs and tastes.

According to the Liberia News Agency (LINA), Ambassador Wilson was reacting to an editorial in the government-owned Ghanaian Times which said Liberia's resumption of ties with Israel was a "great tragedy" and a "direct threat to the security of the West African sub-region."

The editorial said by getting on speaking terms once again with Israel following a 12-year lull, Liberia was "opening its own economic development to Israeli sabotage."

Ambassador Wilson dismissed this argument as "irresponsible and an indirect attack on and a meddling in the internal affairs of Liberia."

He wondered if a recent visit to Ghana by a group of Israeli experts to repair a faulty Ghanaian pipe line was a "disastrous action."

Liberia, the ambassador continued, needs no lecture on what ef-

fects relations with Israel would have on the country's interests.

He added that Liberia preferred to make her intention towards Israel public, instead of joining other African states to play a "Nicodemus" and deal with Israel through the back door.

Directing his attack specifically on the editors of the paper, Ambassador Wilson said by the trend of their argument, the editors had only shown that they were not well informed about world developments, particularly Ghana's relations with Israel.

Two years ago, there were Israeli experts working with the Ghanaian Ministry of Agriculture on projects at Nsawam and Aburi, he revealed.

The ambassador also charged that there are three Israeli companies in Ghana at present, namely: Dizengoff, which produces irrigation materials, paint and tent materials; Gold Star, a local representative of Zimline of Israel and Alugan, manufacturers of aluminium products.

Honorable Wilson concluded his two-page rebuttal by saying that there are Israeli representatives in one form or the other in more than 12 African countries.

"The only difference is that, these states deal with Israel through the back door, while Liberia does so through the front door", he said.

LIBERIA

BRIEFS

WORK PERMIT REVENUE--New work permit booklets designed by the Ministry of Labor are to give Government's revenue a boost of about \$1m this year. Of the amount, Government has already realized \$100,000 from the sale of the booklets for the last few months. In an interview with the DAILY OBSERVER yesterday, the Director of Alien Registration and Naturalization at the Ministry of Labor, Mrs. Augusta Paye, said the amount represents 2,000 of the 29,000 booklets which were printed by the ministry. The new work permit booklets are written both in French and English and are priced at \$50 each, Mrs. Paye said. She added that about 50 per cent of aliens have registered for the new booklets since the ministry announced the August 31, 1983 deadline. In order to ensure compliance with the Labor Laws of the country, she added, the ministry's inspectors are launching a "reinforcement campaign" in all agencies. Mrs. Paye said any aliens found without permits being regularized will be fined \$500 for the first offense. She added that employers will also be fined \$1,000 for their failure to ensure that aliens working with them regularize their work permits. For the second offense, she continued, both employees and their employers will be fined \$1,000 and \$2,000 each, respectively. [Excerpt] [Monrovia DAILY OBSERVER in English 16 Sep 83 pp 1, 10]

CSO: 3400/42

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

HEALTH MINISTER VISITS PORTUGAL TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Aug 83 p 3

[Text] The minister of health of Sao Tome and Principe, Jorge Tiny, who is in Portugal on a visit, met with the minister of foreign affairs, Jaime Gama. According to a communique from the Foreign Ministry, the meeting was extremely cordial and enabled the two parties to have a lengthy exchange of views on subjects of interest involving the relations between the two countries, and particularly promoting activities in the field of cooperation.

Jorge Tiny also had a working meeting with the state secretary for cooperation, Ambassador Luis Gaspar da Silva, which was also attended by high officials in the State Secretariat for Cooperation and in the field of commerce in that country.

Various topics related to cooperation between the two countries were discussed at the meeting, including economic problems such as the status of the soap, oil, sugar and alcohol industries, and the urban electrification project, in which the EEC participates. They also discussed the final stage of the construction of the runway for the Sao Tome Island airport, and expressed the hope that it can soon be used by TAP planes.

The meeting took place in an "atmosphere of great mutual understanding," and led to "positive results, in establishing activities to be conducted and the conclusion of projects already initiated."

Minister Tiny, who was honored at a dinner held by the state secretary for cooperation, will stay in Portugal until the 18th. He will be meeting with other Portuguese officials and with various private business concerns.

Exchange with Cape Verde

The state secretary attached to the office of the prime minister of Cape Verde, Corsino Fortes, met in Lisbon with the board of directors of Portuguese Radio-Television [RTP].

Following previous meetings, this one focussed on the exchange between the TRP and Cape Verde Television, which has had trainees in Portugal for the past 3 months.

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

BRIEFS

AIRPORT EXPANSION--The works for widening the runways of the Sao Tome Airport will be completed on 24 September, according to what ANOP learned yesterday from a diplomatic source. Those works, carried out by a Portuguese enterprise, were one of the points discussed during the conversations that Carlos Tiny, chairman of the Tomian side of the Mixed Commission, has recently taken part in in Lisbon. Health and Sports Minister Tiny, who returns to his country today, again consulted yesterday with Gaspar da Silva, Portuguese secretary of state for cooperation and is also meeting with Miranda Calha, Portuguese secretary of state for sports. In a few months Carlos Tiny is to visit Portugal again. Between now and the date of his visit an ambassador of Sao Tome and Principe will be designated. The position is vacant now and the embassy is in the care of a charge d'affaires. Furthermore, it is known in diplomatic circles that after the conclusion of the works on the Sao Tome Airport a date will be fixed for an official visit that Portuguese President Ramalho Eanes will pay to this African nation. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Aug 83 p 5] 12,116

CSO: 3442/346

SOMALIA

PARTY OFFICIAL, MINISTER RETURN FROM VISITS

EA301522 Mogadishu Domestic Service in Somali 0430 GMT 30 Sep 83

[Excerpt] The chairman of the finance bureau of the party Central Committee, Challe Brigadier General Mohamed Shaykh Osman, returned to the country yesterday afternoon at the end of a several-day visit to Italy.

Similarly, a delegation led by the minister of livestock, forestry and range, Dr Mohamed ali Nur, which was part of the delegation led by Somali Democratic Republic President Challe Mohamed Siad Barre that recently visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, returned yesterday afternoon. Speaking to a SONNA reporter in the airport VIP lounge, Challe Mohamed ali Nur said that during his visit to Saudi Arabia he held various meetings with senior Saudi officials, with whom he discussed matters related to the strengthening of livestock trade between the two brotherly states. He said the talks were successful and ended in understanding.

The minister went on to say that he had also met the chairman of the Islamic Development Bank, with whom he held talks on the strengthening of the economic cooperation between Somalia and the bank.

CSO: 3403/2

SOMALIA

BRIEFS

CIVILIAN DEFECTIONS REPORTED--Reports from [words indistinct] of General Aynanshe confirm that [words indistinct] more than 1,500 civilians have joined the (?DFSS). The escapees who have joined the armed struggle are reported to be involved in various exercises in the DFSS [Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia] training camps. [Text] [EA032201 (Clandestine) Radio Halgan in Somali to Somalia 1800 GMT 3 Oct 83]

CSO: 3403/2

TRANSKEI LEADER'S PAY RAISE DRAWS COMMENT

London AFRICA NOW in English Sep 83 p 37

[Article: "South Africa: Luxury for Some in Puppet Land"]

[Text] Like most leaders, Chief Kaiser Matanzima effectively decides his own pay rise. With some help from the South African Government, his new salary was recently announced, as the effects of the year's devastating drought were setting in.

As if to display his bogus "independence" from Pretoria, Matanzima's annual pay packet of R75,000 (about £45,000) now stands a whole R15,000 (about £9,000) above that of his paymaster, South African Prime Minister P. W. Botha, excluding allowances.

The full gaucheness and tactlessness of such a move is made all the clearer by a report released at the time of the pay rise which details changing statistics since the Transkei became the first to grab at South Africa's new "independence" deal for bantustans in 1976.

Rather than prising the territory from the grip of apartheid, The Transkei's new status has made it all the more dependent on the South African budget, according to the British economist who drew up the report. While the statistics themselves provide little view of the real horror of day-to-day Transkeian life, they do offer some measure of how great the differential is between Matanzima's own life of luxury and the price paid by the majority of the citizens, whose opinion of "independence" is less than positive.

About 352,000 workers migrate annually to "White" South Africa. Of these, 200,000 are contract workers on the mines, while others work in manufacturing, agriculture, commerce and industry, and government services. However, his figure excludes the 80,000 or so Transkeians who creep clandestinely into non-bantustan South Africa every year to work without passes.

Put another way, about 75% of all men in the rural areas of the Transkei have been forced to seek work elsewhere, earning some R3bn (about £1.8bn) a year for the South African economy, and paying about R500m (£300m) in taxes to the Republic. Matanzima's acquiescent break from Pretoria in 1976 did not bring any greater slice of these earnings. Indeed, the contribution by Transkeian workers to the South African gross domestic product has increased since then.

We can only assume that the number of illegal migrants is continually growing, and will be swollen further by the drought. An extra 27,000 Transkeians become eligible for work each year, while the Transkei Development Corporation — ostensibly in existence to cater for these people — has created a mere 11,000 new jobs in the past five years.

The problem is greatly aggravated by the uneven distribution of the territory's population: infant mortality is high (about 20% before the age of five; White infant mortality is 1.9%) and life expectancy is low. Thus about half the entire population of the Transkei is between 14 and 65 years-old, all fighting for the new jobs available.

In the rural areas, agricultural production has stagnated since 1960, despite there being areas of potentially very fertile land. Erosion, caused by overcrowding and over-stocking, is now a chronic problem, and the population density has increased to 68 people per square kilometre — among the top three rates in Africa.

The average rural family — more often than not dependent on some migrant wage — receives R400 (about £266) a year, as against families in the urban centres of Umtata and Butterworth, who earn an

average of R3,500 (about £2,250) a year. But even this figure is grossly skewed: half the territory's earnings is tied up in the hands of the top 10%, largely civil servants and traders.

In its turn, South Africa has attempted to make propaganda capital out of the compliant bantustan leaders. Botha's government recently argued that it was now one of the biggest "foreign aid donors" in the world, by virtue of the direct grants to bantustan authorities. The Transkei's own expenditure which last year included R514,000 (£308,400) on new

cars for the Cabinet, is 70% financed by such direct funding. Since 1976, South Africa's budget allocation to the Transkei has increased from R129m (about £77.4m) to the present R200m (about £120m).

The government has so far deported about 3½m Blacks to the bantustan areas. To stave off total chaos brought on by the drought, the Transkei has received drought relief aid from Pretoria — but for the meantime, the crisis is likely to shed an even harsher spotlight on its dependence on the White regime ●

CSO: 3400/39

SOUTH AFRICA

RESERVE BANK REPORT SHOWS EASING OF RECESSION

MB040720 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 4 Oct 83

[Text] Encouraging signs that South Africa's 22-month recession may have begun to level out are contained in the latest quarterly bulletin of the Reserve Bank. Our economic staff reports that the figures again underline the effect of the drought, and that economic indicators could have been far more positive had there been no drought.

Excluding agricultural output, South Africa's gross domestic product in real terms--in other words, after accounting for inflation--actually showed a marginal increase in the second quarter. This is the first increase in 5 consecutive quarter, or in 15 months.

It's also encouraging that the small growth, with the exclusion of agriculture, was achieved despite the economy not yet having reaped any benefits from increased exports because of the beginning of the economic recovery in the United States and other industrial nations. Although demand for South Africa's exports has not improved, and despite the decline in the gold price since February, the country has continued to adjust well in its balance of payments. In the second quarter, the surplus grew to an adjusted annual rate of 1,800 million rands.

There is also good news in regard to inflation. Although at about 12 and 1/2 percent the reserve bank has emphasized that the rate is still too high, economic adjustment is beginning to bear fruit in easing inflationary pressure. Among the positive indications are the lower increases in imported prices, a slowing down in the rate of increases in wages and salaries, unit labor costs, and administered prices.

CSO: 3400/43

SOUTH AFRICA

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans 3 Sep 83 p 7

[Report on lecture given by Assistant Director-General of Finances G.P. Croeser: "Basis of Success of New Structure Depends (on Financial Discipline)."]

[Text] The success of the new constitutional structure will depend mainly on the financial means made available by the various groups for the financing of their own affairs, and there can be only one governing financial authority in South Africa, according to Mr G.P. Croeser, assistant director-general of finances.

At the Conference of the South African Institute for Public Administration in Pretoria yesterday, Mr Croeser gave a speech on "Finances and the Realization of State Reform."

Mr Croeser, who emphasized that he is giving his personal view in the report, said that the new structure will require adjustments and make new demands on the country's financial and budget structure. Obviously parliamentary control over state finances and financial policy may not be hampered.

Financial discipline and the establishing of priorities with regard to state expenditures are extremely important, and under no circumstances will one be permitted to abandon that discipline and the economic principles according to which the distribution of available funds are determined.

In the new structure adjustments will have to be made in the planning process and, apart from the existing treasury which will be responsible for the budgets of general expenditures, each population group will have to have its own financial administration to manage expenditures with respect to its own affairs.

Mr Croeser said that the distribution of tax powers will probably create more problems, amongst other reasons because fiscal discipline will have to be abandoned, because the basis of granting that might be seen as unsatisfactory by several population groups, because it will be difficult to find a basis for the distribution of tax sources which is realistic and acceptable to everyone, and because the administration of such a system would actually be an impossible task.

Mr Croeser also said that if every group receives powers to enter into loans in its own right, the economic policy would be greatly hampered and it could lead to, for example, a situation in which more is spent on one's own affairs than what can be

justified in view of the needs of general services and those of other groups.

Mr Croeser said that in his opinion the various groups could effectuate their own income in one way: through the levying of service fees with respect to the things which the group concerned has classified as its own affairs. The other groups would not have any say over that and that income could be used by the group concerned only for the service on which those fees are levied, education for example.

The various groups will have to be provided with money from a single state income fund. To prevent that money from having to be voted into the budget each year and thus from being continually subject to political debate, he proposes that a statutory grant--calculated on the basis of a formula considering the needs of the various communities and the relative level of service provided--be made to each group annually. A formula, for example, could be the relationship between pupil, classroom and teaching staff or the number of hospital beds per 100,000 population.

If a general sum is handed over annually to each group and the spending of it is left exclusively to its own discretion, problems might arise because all of the expenditures will be coming from a central income fund; Mr Croeser said he neither expects there to be more than one Elected Committee on Public Accounts for the three groups and the joint parliament, nor more than one auditor-general.

8700

CSO: 3401/31

CONSERVATIVE ATTACKS GOVERNMENT CONCESSIONS TO HOMELANDS

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 31 Aug 83 p 3

[Text] According to Jaap Marais, the leader of the Reconstituted Nationalist Party, the government's policy has turned out to be a mockery of what it was originally intended to be. A number of regions, to which blacks have no historical claims, have been declared as balck regions, while the conditions for independence which were traditionally set by the Nationalist Party, have not been met in the opinion of Mr Marais.

Addressing a public meeting at Cullinan, on the occasionof the government's decision to incorporate a large white areas to KwaNdebele, Mr Marais stated that in the past Nationalist Party governments have recognized only three black homelands: Transkei, Ciskei and Kwa Zulu. With a "stroke of the hand" several other black regions have now also been declared as homelands and they are now in the process of being granted independence.

The recognized Nationalist Party policy has always been that independence can be granted only if the states in question could prove economic self sufficiency. They must also give proof of political responsibility. Another stiff condition for independence has been that it must not present a danger to white South Africa.

In the past the Nationalist Party set the year 2000 as a possibility for the black states attainment of independence. By that year the number of blacks in white regions is not to exceed the number of whites and the whites must feel safe in their own regions. However, black states have been politically emancipated before being economically self supporting. As a result of this the economic burden upon the whites has simply doubled. "Politically the blacks can do as they please, but the whites must pay for this."

Mr Marais stated that the government makes boasts about free initiative, but has turned the homelands into welfare states. There are no greater welfare states than these very black regions and they are literally surviving on extra white allowances. Moreover, this sort of welfare policy is not only being applied to the national states, but to the blacks within South Africa as well.

"We are experiencing the essence of socialism in the government's policy with respect to black states. Today government policy entails the most unacceptable elements of both capitalism and socialism: the formation of monopolies and the equalization of peoples, irrespective of their capacities.

"The government's homelands policy makes a mockery of the vision originally envisaged with respect to black regions. The present national states are not the states of black nations. President Lucas Mangope boasts of the very fact that his country is a multiracial state. Due to the fact that racial separation laws have been abolished that state is being used as a base for the political subversion of South Africa."

Mr Marais stated that the present national states are moreover being utilized for the moral subversion of both white South Africa and the local black populations. The social and moral fabric of blacks is being affected by casinos with the results that the work force in the regions cannot be utilized as it should be. Although the establishment of gambling houses clashes with the moral concepts of both whites and blacks their establishment continues, because that is in the interest of the money powers.

Less than half of Transvaal (the former land of pioneers) now remains, as a result of the government's homelands policy, and in the remaining parts the whites are no longer the only rulers. As a result of the government's constitutional proposals the whites must share the region with the Indians and the coloreds. In addition full local administrative powers are being assigned to black residential areas. Thus South Africa is becoming nothing else than a multiracial state.

As for KwaNdebele, Mr Marais pointed out the repeated assurances given by the government in the past to the effect that the borders of 1975 would not be infringed. For example Mr Braam Raubenheimer, a former cabinet minister, stated in 1975 that the consolidation of that year became final when an additional 52,000 hectares was added to the existing 51,000 hectares. In September 1977 Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg stated that the government remained bound to the 1936 Act. That legislation made no provisions for the transfer of white towns such as Mafeking and Port St Johns to black states. According to the government's most recent consolidation proposals for KwaNdebele, this state's area will be seven times greater than it was originally.

"What is happening in a government which is so faithless to the very people whose interests it must protect? Can such a government have the competence of ruling a country if it has no basis on which it can be trusted and has no credibility?

It is not only the property owners in the region in question who are being affected by the government's decisions, but every white person in South Africa; so stated Mr Marais. What is being affected is not only the government's public honor but also a people's most cherished possession, their own country.

The government has no principle upon which the borders of KwaNdebele have been based. They cannot be backed up by historic facts and are evidently the result of arbitrary measures. If numbers are taken as the criterion, then this is not acceptable, because then the whole of South Africa would not be enough. The addition of land does not offer a solution of the problem in any way at all, said Mr Marais.

7964

CSO: 3401/28

ULTRACONSERVATIVE LEADERS STILL DISUNITED

Pretoria DIE PATRIOT in Afrikaans 26 Aug 83 p 12

[Text] The Conservative Party [KP] will continue to bring together those who belong together on the basis of their convictions. However, collaboration with leaders who display an attitude of hate and enmity is out of the question.

These were the words used by Dr Andries Treurnicht, the head of the Conservative Party, while summarizing in a nutshell the present state of affairs between the KP and the Reunited Nationalist Party [HNP].

Speaking at the Transvaal KP congress held in Pretoria he made it clear that the KP has gone to great lengths in bringing about collaboration between the KP and the HNP, but that the HNP leadership's recalcitrance has thus far prevented this.

"I believe that people with a balanced sense of reason, who have the interest of their people at heart, will realize this and lend increasing support to the KP."

Dr Treurnicht also made it clear that the acrimony and abuses evidenced in statements made by HNP leaders ever since the interim elections offer no prospects of collaboration with them.

He came up with a whole series of reasons influencing the relations between the KP and the HNP, namely:

--Since our establishment as a party we have made no attacks on the HNP and its leaders.

--We have dedicated ourselves to the banding together of the conservative voting strength and we feel that this is still necessary and possible.

--We will continue to dedicate ourselves to the collaboration of all conservatives and supporters of separate development and white freedom so as to oppose powersharing and multiracial government.

--On various occasions we conducted discussions with leaders of the HNP with a view to collaboration in the event of an election.

--There are differences in policy, but we have been under the impression that such differences could be ironed out; this is something that both sides have stated.

--The HNP's implacable demand that there must be a 50-50 distribution of seats has been something far out of touch with reality and unacceptable. Moreover, the reaction of Mr Marais has been that we have nothing more to say to each other in this respect and he has cut off this discussion.

--On the occasion of the four interim elections of 10 May we proposed that the KP be the standing party in Waterberg and Soutpansberg and that we would support the HNP in Waterkloof and Carletonville.

This was refused.

--During the interim elections we became the major target of attack by the HNP and the Nationalist Party!

--The HNP's withdrawal from Soutpansberg and its fight against the KP in Waterberg is an example of opportunistic political leadership with which we will not have anything to do.

That is not the way you look for collaboration.

--The acrimony and abuses contained in statements made by HNP leaders since the interim elections do not offer any prospects of collaboration with those leaders.

--According to DIE AFRIKANER of 27 July 1983 Mr Jaap Marais "stated that KP leaders have a record in lack of credibility!"

"This is the way I put it to you:

"The Conservative Party will continue to bring together those who belong together on the basis of conviction and on the basis of our principles and policy of mutual trust and respect.

"I believe that people with a balanced sense of reason, who have the interest of their people at heart, will realize this and lend increasing support to the KP."

7964

CSO: 3401/28

SOUTH AFRICA

RESULTS OF STERILIZATION PROGRAM

Capetown DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 8 Sep 83 p 3

[Report: "Sterilization Increases in South Africa."]

[Text] In 1982, over 26,000 women and 2,000 men were sterilized in South Africa according to an announcement by the Minister of Health and Welfare Dr Nak van der Merwe.

During the first 6 months of this year 14,000 women and 1,000 men were sterilized. "Sterilization is only part of the family planning program," said Professor N.S.Louw, head of the obstetrics department of the Tygerberg hospital, yeasterday.

Haphazardly

"The goal of family planning, of which sterilization constitutes about 10 percent at the Tygerberg hospital, is to promote the development of the entire population as such.

"An improved life and a better chance for development is necessary for all people in South Africa, and responsible parenthood is the answer," according to Professor Louw.

"Women and men are not being sterilized haphazardly, but judiciously and according to their state of health and the number of children in the family."

Technique

"I would like more men to be sterilized--it is so easy and simple and has no influence on a man's manliness," he said.

A simple technique to sterilize women under local anesthesia has been developed by the Tygerberg hospital. An analysis of almost 10,000 women sterilized by that technique by a team of physicians at the Tygenberg hospital shows that their average age is 36, their family is complete, and their average number of children of over 4 years of age is six, Professor Louw said.

Fewer white women (4,8999) have been sterilized than black women (12,231) or colored women (6,925) because white women had already started with family planning long before the other population groups.

According to Professor Louw, colored patients are tested for sterilization against the following conditions:

Abnormal

--If a woman is age forty or over and she and her husband request sterilization, it is allowed only if the couple already has a living child over 4 years old. (Most colored children die between the ages of one and four, and the possibility of having abnormal children after age 40 is higher than for having normal children.)

--If a woman is over 35, she must have at least two children over 4 years old, and if a woman is over 30, she must have at least three children over 4 years old; women under thirty must have at least four living children.

8700

CSO: 3401/31

MWU OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MULTIRACIAL UNION AIMS

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 31 Aug 83 p 5

[Text] There is a commotion among labor ranks over the argument advanced by a multiracial union, the Boiler Makers Association, that blacks be included in a fourth chamber for blacks in the proposed constitutional arrangement.

In its official newspaper this trade union has expressed misgivings over the lack of provisions for blacks saying that this may render the abolishment of discrimination impossible and prevent the establishment of equal opportunities for all. The trade union asserts that the non-inclusion of blacks represents the most serious flaw in the arrangement.

Mr Arrie Paulus, the secretary of the Mine Workers Union [MWU], has written an interest arousing front page article in the most recent issue of DIE MYNWERKER, the MWU's official newspaper, to the effect that the MWU's warnings are now being proven to be true.

The Warning

Mr Paulus writes: "We fear that if a multiracial union such as the Boiler Makers' Association is now starting to argue that blacks be allowed to have a say in the government of this country, an increasing number of mixed unions will also be raising their voices in favor of satisfying the demands of peoples of other color in their own trade unions."

Mr Paulus said that on a previous occasion the MWU warned that if a multiracial union were to be honest with all its members it would have to do everything in its power to obtain the same benefits for all its members, irrespective of race or color, even if this entails the political sphere.

"This is the first sign of a multiracial trade union entering the political sphere. The MWU is a white trade union, it represents only the white members and therefore it cannot and will not attempt to defend the new constitution. We believe that white South Africa must govern itself. It must not allow people of other color to have any say on how the country must be governed.

"Examining this matter deeper: If the coloreds and Indians were to be allowed in the cabinet, in Parliament and its various houses, then they would be coming up with an ever increasing number of demands. The final end would be a death blow to our Group Areas Act and other legislations."

Mr Paulus goes on to say that the result of this will be that the non-whites will want to attend the same schools as the whites, live in the same residential areas, use the same hospitals and demand the same pensions, salaries and all the other advantages enjoyed by the whites.

Lowered Standards

Every right-minded person knows that we cannot afford this sort of thing and that the only way that this can be attained is through the lowering of white standards of living. Those of the coloreds and Indians would have to be raised and those of the whites lowered. This would mean that even the whites' educational standards would have to be lowered in order to fit in with those of the non-whites.

Mr Paulus: "What I predict is that if the blacks come up with a demand for a fourth chamber then the government will have no other way out than to allow them in.

"And now, like we warned, we have the situation where mixed trade unions are advocating taking the blacks into the new arrangement, because they have peoples of other color in their own ranks.

"Whether white members of those trade unions agree or do not agree with such an approach does not matter. The thing which is of importance now is the fact that the cause of the coloreds is being pleaded, even if this is intended to show that they are also looking after their interests.

"In this process the interests of the white worker must suffer on account of that; just like the interests of the white voter in the country will be suffering under the new arrangement.

"This is the reason why the MWU is sticking to its stand that it is a trade union for whites. It will continue to represent these interests by also assuming a stand in the political area and by warning its members against the dangers entailed in this situation." So stated Mr Paulus.

7964

CSO: 3401/28

BRIEFS

POLITICAL ROLE OF CHURCH--People who don't understand that the Afrikaner is in the midst of an unusual process of adjustment don't understand today's Afrikaner. This adjustment has come up for discussion in various ways, including in the largest Afrikaner church, the Dutch Reformed Church. One of the important examples is last year's decision of the General Synod that the publication RAS, VOLK EN NASIE [Race, People and Nation] should be continually revised. For that matter, the first paragraph of the article itself reads: "The Church cannot permit itself the luxury of considering race- and population relations to be completed at a certain moment. . . ." Therefore it is gratifying that the West Transvaal Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church last week made short shrift of an attempt to prevent RAS, VOLK EN NASIE from being thoroughly revised. Dr Danie Rosslee, previous moderator of the West Transvaal Synod, wanted a selective revision which would change as little as possible in the main structures and views of RAS, VOLK EN NASIE, but his proposal was rejected. The final result after that revision could well be that the main structures remain unchanged, but it is wrong to make decisions already now which would hamper the revision of the publication. What the church and the country need as a whole is an open mind to try and find solutions for our problems within the guiding lines of the Word. Not to allow worldly prejudices to serve in advance as an obstacle to the light we are seeking. [Text] [Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans 29 Aug 83 pp 12] 8700

LESOTHO ATTACK CHARGE--The Government of Lesotho says a man was killed last Saturday during an abortive attempt to assassinate a junior minister, Mr Julius Khasoane. Three other men were captured and Mr Khasoane escaped unhurt in the incident, which took place at his country home. A spokesman in Maseru has alleged that the men were sent to Maseru by South Africa. Commenting on the charge in Pretoria, a South African spokesman described the charge as predictable propaganda and rhetoric and said that Lesotho wanted to blame South Africa for all its problems. [Text] [MB301850 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 30 Sep 83]

CSO: 3400/43

TANZANIA

DAR ES SALAAM REPORTS 2-DAY MEETING OF ARMY HIGH COMMAND

EA010913 Dar Es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 1700 GMT 30 Sep 83

[Text] A meeting of the army High Command has ended in Dar Es Salaam with an expression of its sincere gratitude to the party and government for the steps taken and being taken to resolve the long-standing administration problems facing the army.

Chairman of the meeting, Lieutenant General (David Musoguri), said on behalf of the army High Command and all ranks that the problems obstruct work, reduce efficiency and adversely affect army discipline. He added that the government's plan to provide the army's essential services has been received with joy by members of the force.

Following its 2-day meeting, the High Command issued an official statement congratulating the police force for the manner in which it prepared and is now supervising the defense and security forces games currently being held in Dar Es Salaam. The statement also stressed that the games again demonstrate the extent of cohesiveness, unity and fraternity of the forces.

CSO: 3400/43

UPPER VOLTA

BRIEFS

CDR FUNCTIONS--In an interview broadcast by Ouagadougou radio, the National Chairman of the Revolutionary Defence Committees (CDRs), Maj Kabore, said he welcomed the opportunity "to dedramatise what is being heard". He said the CDR was a revolutionary body created spontaneously at the instigation of the Chairman of the National Council of the Revolution. Of the CDRs' four functions--political, socio-economic, cultural and military--the last was "the most delicate one because this is the cause of the current concern among the people". Because an armed attack would not be ruled out, Kabore said it had been decided that "two delegates from each quarter will be taught the use of arms and sent back to their quarters...I want to dedramatise what is being heard now so I inform the people that we do not intend to set up 100,000-strong militia just in Ouagadougou in order to terrorise the people. Our objective is to know that any Upper Voltan can use a weapon at any time and defend his country and his revolution against all enemies. On the CDRs' other functions Kabore said they would undertake services like street cleaning and road building and carry out popular activities, such as putting on plays, in order to denounce imperialism and other bourgeois malpractices and to show the people to what extent the country's economy was under foreign domination. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3447 5 Sep 83 p 2082]

CSO: 3400/42

ZAIRIAN OPPOSITION LEADER ON MOBUTU'S REGIME

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 10 Aug 83 pp 26-28

[Interview with Etienne Tsishekedi, cofounder of the opposition party Union for Democracy and Social Progress, in July 1983 in Kinshasa, by reporter Guy Bouten: "'It's Always Just Mobutu.' The Thirteen Zairian Members of Parliament After Their Release;" interview apparently translated from French; passages enclosed in slantlines in boldface]

[Excerpts] The case of the Zairian members of parliament who were arrested and convicted as a result of their political activities was the direct cause of the sharp cooling in Belgian-Zairian relations last year. There was no change until President /Mobutu/ had announced a general amnesty and the imprisoned members of parliament were set free again. /Guy Bouten/ of BRT's [Belgian Radio and Television] world service was in Kinshasa with Foreign Minister /Leo Tindemans/. He looked the dissidents up.

Arranging a meeting with Etienne Tsishekedi is as easy as can be. There are no security guards standing before the door and the heavy iron gate that closes his villa off from the curious stands ajar. Around the house, which was built by its inhabitant after independence, it is busy. There are clearly things going on. I am invited to take a seat in a waiting room where there are already ten people. It looks like the cabinet of a country doctor with a large practice.

My arrival is warmly greeted by the others. I talk about the approval the UDSP [Union for Democracy and Social Progress] has met with in Belgium, about Professor Dikonda's [identified earlier in text as cofounder of and foreign spokesman for the UDSP] press conference and the letters he has shown me about the fate of Tsishekedi, /Ngalula/, /Kibassa/ and the others. When I tell the story that is told at home about how Ngalula is supposed to have almost been killed by poisonous snakes that his guards let loose on him, the men laugh heartily. "No," they say, "that story is certainly exaggerated."

Etienne Tsishekedi looks, nevertheless, well. My question as to how he got along in prison he waves off with disinterest: /"Pas torture, mais mal traite." [Not tortured, but poorly treated.] So it seems that his compulsory stay in Bandundu was more a sort of internal banishment. He received sufficient freedom of movement to allow him, among other things, to plant two hectares of corn, peanuts and manioc. In short, Tsishekedi spent his time in Bandundu profitably.

[Question] Is the Zairian crisis not primarily an economic crisis instead of a political one?

[Answer] No, the crisis is above all political. It is the country's structures that are no good. The Zairians no longer recognize themselves, they are discouraged because they are not involved in the interests of the country. When the people do not want to go along, there can be no talk of development. Thus, for instance, foreign aid makes no sense as long as the Zairians themselves are not participating in the building of the land.

[Question] That is demagogery, political opponents will say to him. Just look at Kinshasa. The city numbered scarcely 300,000 inhabitants in 1960. Now, more than three million people live there. Is that not mostly a matter of people who were much better off before, but who were attracted to the city against their better judgment? How do you explain the misery in Kinshasa? Is that solely the fault of the regime?

[Answer] The problem of the flight from the countryside is present throughout Africa. But federalization, economic and political decentralization could bring a solution in Zaire. If the different regions could develop themselves freely, the migration to the city could be slowed down. But the Mobutu regime centralizes everything and in this way promotes the flight from the countryside.

[Question] But was Mobutu's centralization not intended to put an end to the tribal disputes that played such an ugly role in Zaire in the years following independence?

[Answer] Certainly, Mobutu undoubtedly put an end to the tribal disputes. But I still believe that only a dispersal of power to the regions can bring solace at the present.

[Question] Have you an explanation as to why Mobutu has now suddenly announced an amnesty measure for political prisoners and for foreign exiles?

[Answer] I think that a number of personal and political interventions from abroad have worked to our advantage. At present, there is an international demand everywhere for attention to human rights. And, moreover, it's in fact normal that men giving battle to a dictatorship like Mobutu's receive attention.

[Question] Do you remain, in the meantime, a member of the UDSP? And, if so, does your party remain a branch of Nguza Karl-I-Bond's Democratic Front FCD [Congolese Front for the Restoration of Democracy]?

[Answer] I am one of the founding members of the UDSP. We joined the FCD because we wanted to make our campaign as efficient as possible. It made no sense to spread the opposition forces too thin. There must appear just one formation abroad, as a sort of antenna, in order that the attention we ask for our problems, our complaints meet with a wider response. Precisely because we do not come into our own here in the media.

[Question] And what about Mungul-Diaka? How was your relationship with him?

[Answer] Our party can lay no claim to /Mungul-Diaka/. Mungul's CLC [Council for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa] existed already in autumn of 1980; we just established the UDSP in July of last year. Mungul did do us certain favors while he was staying in Belgium. That's true.

[Question] Are you receiving support from abroad? You stay in Kinshasa while decisions in connection with Zaire are being made in Brussels, Paris and Washington? Or does precisely this explain your alliance with Nguza?

[Answer] It's too bad that the three countries you name care so little about us. They are concerned only with the regime. It is an outright scandal that so little comprehension of our demand for more political freedom is displayed abroad.

But, you must understand me well, our struggle is not primarily directed against Mobutu. We bear the president, personally, no ill will. For us, it's a matter of his engourage--the so-called barons of the regime. Moreover, this fable that the Zairians are not capable of governing themselves must be done away with once and for all. There exists a political class, which for the most part has been educated abroad. These people could direct the political, social and economic life of the country once again into good channels. But, you know, the MPR [Popular Movement of the Revolution] has all the power in its hands. And that, of course, cannot be, especially not when one sees what they have brought to pass.

[Question] How many members does your party number? Do you receive much support in the institutions, in the MPR itself, the army, the magistracy?

[Answer] Since the party is not legally recognized, we officially do not exist and thus we also have no members. That's obvious. But sympathizers, people who are favorably disposed to our cause, we have everywhere. In fact, all the people are advocates of more political freedom. If the popularity of the UDSP must be tested, one simply has

to organize a referendum. We are not afraid of this. A recent opinion poll showed that 87 percent of Zairians share our ideas. But once again, I want to state very clearly and, at the same time, clear up a misunderstanding that seems to exist everywhere: We do not want to do away with Mobutu. We only want reforms so that the Zairians can speak freely. Then it will be easier to find solutions to the problems with which the country must struggle.

[Question] Is your entire group in agreement about this?

[Answer] Everyone is agreed. /Dia/ too, who was still in Belgium in June.

[Question] Mobutu says that the establishment of a second political party is not in keeping with Bantu philosophy?

[Answer] Now, what sort of point of departure is that? Mobutu appointed me Minister of the Interior in November 1965, after his second coup d'etat. Together we drafted a new constitution which was massively approved in a referendum on 24 June 1967. In Article 4 of this constitution it says: "No more than two political parties may be established." During this period, politicians also sought me out to ask if they might set up a second party. But at that time Mobutu asked for some patience. And that was logical, as the MPR itself was still in its infancy; so I was able to appreciate his wanting to first build up his own party.

But in 1970 he struck Article 4 out of the constitution with his own hand, with the argument that a second political party would not be in keeping with the Bantu mentality. For that matter, he indirectly admitted to me in April of last year that he had gone too far in hanging the label of /state-party/ on the MPR. For him, that meant that all political discussion would become superfluous. On a legal level that is, of course, a pure fiction.

[Question] So the struggle for recognition continues?

[Answer] Yes, in so far as it's possible.

[Question] You are picking up the thread where you had to drop it after your arrest in March of last year?

[Answer] That's right. We just want Zaire to become more democratic. And we have come a step further. I was received by the president, together with Kibassa-Maliba and Ngalula, and we were offered concrete proposals.

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ZAMBIA

BRIEFS

SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT AID--The Zambian and Swedish Governments have reached an agreement in which Sweden is to extend a grant of about 68 million Kwacha to Zambia in development aid during the next 3 years. The development cooperation agreement for the 1984-85 period replaces the current one of a similar duration which expired at the end of this week and covers agriculture, health, education, and (?import) support. The acting permanent secretary for the National Commission for Development Planning, Dr Ephraim Kaunda, signed for the Zambian Government, while the deputy director of the Swedish International Development Agency, (Leif Olaf Edwardsonn), signed for the Swedish Government. [Text] [MB020702 Lusaka Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 1 Oct 83 MB]

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